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nils 8tu(fy trill attempt to show the role that the Morris Plan and
other Industrial banking oompenies play as agencies of oonstxmer instal¬
ment credit.
The industrial banking company cannot be described or analyzed
easily. Althovigh it engages in a number of consumer financing activities,
some of the operations are not immediately associated with consumer credit.
This i^e of financing agency may be classified) however, in terms of
certain distinguishing operating features) and thus an industrial banking
company may be defined as an institution which specializes in consxmier
Instalment financing and obtains pert of its working fmds from customers
deposits) the sale of investment certificates of small denominations) or
both.
Purpose and Scope.— The purpose of this study will be to show how
Institutions of this type organize the savings of one group of customers
as a supply fund out of which it erfcends loans to anoidier group of
customers. The two customer groups served are drawn largely from the
wage-earning and salaried classes) so that the industrial benking ocmpany
functions as an intermediary between the savings and credit needs of both
classes.
Souree etnd Material.-- In the preparation of this study, we have
gathered data from many sources. Thorough utilization of applicable
available text material was made, incltading the Constmer Research Bulletin,
Banking Law Journal, American Economic Review and the American Acadray of
Political and Social Science for historical end theoretical ideas on the
problem.
Slgnlfioanoe of Study.— It is felt that the signifioanee of this
study stems from the fact that it reveals the role industrial banking
played in perpetuating and expanding consumer instalment credit as one of
the major factors in the Amecian economy.
CHAPTER I
NATURE AND SCOPE OF INDUSTRIAL LENDING
The field of oonsumer credit described as "industrial lending" has
no fixed limits« and the institutions it encompasses - here called in-
1
d\istrial banking compsmies - operate under a wide variety of names. The
initial problem, then is to fonnulate a definition which will describe
the agencies euad at the same time distinguish them from others operating,
in some respects, along similar lines. For the purpose of the present
study, an industrial banking company is held to be an institution which
extends consumer loans repayable on an instalment basis, and obtains at
least part of its working funds from the acceptance of deposits or the
sale of investment certificates. This definition will be adhered to
throtighout the discussion, and since it may appear to some readers too
arbitrary or too restrictive, and to others too ocmprehensive or too in¬
definite, it is advisable to summarize the considerations which have governed
its adoption.
It is impossible to mark off the field of industrial lending simply
by including it in only those agencies which call themselves "industrial
banks." Such a procedure would exclude many companies which because of
legal restrictions cannot employ the term "bank" in Iheir corporate titles.
Nor would the presence of the term "Morris Plan" in the title of an in¬
stitution be a sufficient criterion. All banking companies in the Morris
^In addition to "industrial bank," the names most frequently en¬
countered are "industrial loan company," "industrial savings and loan
company," "finance and thrift company," and "discount company."
1
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Plan systea come wi-ttiin the scope of the present study, but that system
does not include a growing number of agencies which perfom similar
functions though they are entirely unconnected with this group of companies.
Moreover, Idiere are a few firms which are affiliated with the Morris
Plan system, in the sense that they have paid the requisite general
franchise fee to the Morris Plem Corporation of America for the right to
do business as Morris Plan institutions in a certain specified territory,
yet do not exercise the privilege of using the name "Morris Plan" in their
corporate titles.
Even less satisfactory then the title of a fim, as a basis for a
definition on sua industrial banking company, is its legal status. As
will be shown more fully in Chapter II, the laws under which such ocm-
1
panics operate vary markedly from one state to another. In seme states
for example, companies engaged in ind\istrial lending are chartered as
state banks, in others they operate under the law which applies to small
loan companies. A large number of states have provided special statutes
for industrial banking companies. Some laws expressly forbid the inclusion
in the firm name of -the word "bank," and also prohibit -the tedcing of de-
2
posits.
Thus within the field designated as indxistrial lending there is a
wide assortment of institutions, ranging from firms which are "banks" in
every sense of the word and differ from conmerical banks only in that
they deal principally in consumer instalment loans, to agencies which are
^Rolf Sugent and L. N. Robinson, Regulation of the Small Business
(New York, 1936), pp. 113-116.
^Ibid., pp. 116-117.
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almost indistinguishable from personal finance oompeinies.
Since neither terminology nor legal status constitutes a workable
criterion of an industrial banking company, it is only from a functional
point of Tiev that an institution can be classified as belonging to this
separate and distinct gro\ip of consumer credit agencies. In other words,
its inclusion in this category depends not on its name nor on the legal
conditions under which it operates, but on the source of its working funds
and the character of its lending activities.
Indvistrial banking companies have two main functions: they act on
the one hand as savings or thrift institutions and on the other as consumer
1
lending agencies. The first of these functions is the best identifying
characteristic, for such companies have traditionally emphasized their
services as thiift institutions. Where the law under idiioh they operate
denies them the deposite-taking privilege, they resort to the sale of what
are called instalment or investment certificates. These, in practice, are
generally cashable on demand and always, of course, carry a rate of interest
or retiarn for the company’s xise of funds. It is the thrift or savings
feature which distinguishes industrial banking campanies from both personal
finance cco^anles and sales finance companies, but it is the lending
feature which sets them apart from other banking institutions, for the
assets of the industrial banking company wore invested predominantely in
loans of relatively small size, made largely to individuals for consumption
purposes and generally repayable In regular periodic Instalments.
It is possible, -therefore, to regard industrial banking companies as
^Myron R. Bone, Industrial Banks Loan Many Millions Yearly (Amerioein
Industrial Bankers, VoT. 4, B6. 6, TJeoember, 1^8), p.
4
a group of firms which acquire part of -ttieir woxlciiig capital -ttirough the
taking of deposits or the sale of instalment or inrestment certificates,
and Tise their funds primarily by granting loans to consumers repayable
on an Instalment basis. As has already been noted, however, the group is
far from homogeneous, and under the pressure of competition the agencies
which go to make it up tend to expand their operations in all directions
in order to obtain additional business.
The Morris Plan System
As of 1940, industrial lending had grown to a very important
position, over a period of approximately thirty years, during which time
a number of organizations of varying degrees of stability had acted as
promotional agencies in the establishment of this type of institution. A
large proportion of the firms in existence in 1940 were established as
parts of a system of companies and many of them had become independent
units that owed their inception and growth mainly to the promoters of
group systems.
The most important, with regard to both quantitative importance and
continuity of existence, is the Morris Plan group. The first of the
Morris Plan companies, the Fidelity Savings and Trust Company, was
1
established in 1910 by Arthur J. Morris at Norfolk, Virginia. The new
Institution proposed to lend money to persons employed in industry (hence
the name "industrial" loans), on the seouri'^ of the borrower's Inccme
and the endorsement of two or more co-makers; tiius policy commonly expressed
^Louis N. Robinson, "The Morris Plan," American Economic Review, Vol.
2 (June 1931), pp. 227-29.
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as a irllllngness to lend on "character and earning power." It also pro¬
posed to acquire seme of its working funds by selling inTOstment certi¬
ficates which might be paid for, if the purchasers desired, on an instal¬
ment basis*
A measure of the rapidity with irtiloh this movement spread was avail-
1
able only in a record of the opening dates of companies in that period.
Of the 94 canq^anles (exclusive of branches) that were functioning, 71 were
established in the seven-yeeu: period 1911-17. During this period companies
were started in such large cities as Atlanta, Baltimore, New York, St.
Louis, Albany, Cleveland, Boston, Minneapolis,San Francisco, Philadelphia
and Detroit, as well as smaller cities. After 1917 the system continued
to expand, although more slowly. The growth of the Morris Plan system
appears to have been affected considerably by domestic and International
conditions. Ihe development was gradual \mtil the outbreak of the war in
1914; then the system expanded rapidly until the Ihilted States* entrance
into the conflict. However, few were formed in the immediate postwar
period, but between 1921-1930 there was a steady rise.
In 1936, 14 of the 94 Morris Plan banks and companies did not make
use of the term Morris Plan in their titles, and at least one large com¬
pany, the Personal Loan and Savings Bank in Chicago, had dropped out of
2
the system altogether.
nie methods employed In the extension of the Morris Plan system were
^Ibid., pp. 230-32.
A
Official Directory of Morris Plan Banks and Companies (1938), issued
by the Morris Plan Bankers Association, Washington, D. C.
at first relatively siiiple. Mr. Morris and his associates in the various
cities} formed a corporation under the legal conditions most nearly
applicable to this particular type of institution^ sold stock in the com¬
pany and served in an advisory capacity in regard to techniques of
organisation and operation. After a time a more higjhly systematized
scheme of expansion iras worked out, through the Industrial Finance Cox^o-
ration.
In 1912 Mr. Morris had formed the Fidelity Corporation of America,
with an authorized capital of $300,000, and by 1914 this corporation had
established 9 Morris Plan companies in southern states. Its assets were
taken over by the Industrial Finance Corporation, formed in the latter part
of 1914 wiih an authorized oapited of $7,000,000 and a subscribed capital
of $1,500,000. The function of idie Industrial Finance Corporation was to
present and explain the Morris Plan in each city for which it conten^lated
a new company, to enlist the active Interest of prominent citizens, to
organize and train the local stcd'f and to furnish necessary accounting
records emd information. It subscribed for 25 percent of the capital
stock of the local company and received in return a cash fee of $10 for
each share of the total stock; in addition, of course, it participated in
the earnings of the company to the amoxmt of its paid-up stockholdings.
The Industrial Corporation was the parent body of a complicated
corporation system. It had direct control, throiigh stockownership, of
the Morris Flan Corporation of America, ihe Industrial Acceptance Corpo¬
ration, the Industrial Realty Shares, Inc., and the North America Funding
Corporation; it had Indirect control, through the Morris Plan Corporation
of America, of a number of Morris Plan banks and companies and the Morris
7
Plan Insxiranoe Society.
ITm Morris Plan Coirporation of America was the most in^jortant of
these subsidiary companies. IVhen it was fomed in 1925 it acquired the
Industrial Finance Corporation's rl^tS} patents and interest in the ex¬
tension of the Morris Plan, and it was the licensor of all existing Morris
Plan banks and coaqpanies. In some of them it owned stock, either directly
or indirectly through a idiolly owned subsidiary, the Ihdvistrial Banchares
Corporation; in its annual report to stockholders for 1938 the Morris Plan
Corporation of America stated tiiat it held controlling interest in
approximately one-fourth of all these organizations. In 1937, according
to its report for that year, it held controlling stock interest (directly
or indirectly) in 16 compemios, including those in New York, Philadelphia,
Richmond, Washington, I^.C. aud Boston, and minority stock interest in 50
others; Ihere were in that year 29 Morris Plan banks and conqpeinies, exclu-
slTe of branches, with which it was not connected ihrotigh stockowner ship.
The Morris Plan Corporation of America, and its wholly owned subsi¬
diary, Industrial Benchares Corporation, derive their Inccme mainly from
dividends on stockholdings in Morris Plan banks and companies. Out of a
total income for 1938 of i486,212, -this source provided $441,788, and
1
$36,962 came from services to Morris Plan Banks and Ccanpanles. Pre¬
sumably the latter income arises largely from the general franchise fees
paid by local banks and companies, and from payments for auditing services.
Industrial Banchares Corporation was formed in 1927 as the Morris
Plan Shares Corporation; its title was adopted in 1929. When this
^The Morris Plan Corporation of America, Annual Report to Stockholders,
for the yeaur ended December 51, 1939.
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corporation was organized the Industrial Finance Corporation had large
liabilities which had been incurred in order to finance investments in
Horz*is Plan banks and ccmpanies. The new corporation took over these
stockholdings y making payments for them out of the proceeds of a sale of
6 percent bonds maturing in 1947 and by delivering to the Industrial
Finance Corporation its entire auliiorized capital stock. At the end of
1
1939, $2,917,500 of these bonds were oxxtstanding.
In addition to holding a large interest in Morris Plan banks and
companies, the Ind\istrial Finance Corporation had branched out into three
fields, mortgage financing, time sales financing and industrial loan in¬
surance. In 1926 it organized a company, under the name of General Bond
and Share Corporation, which acquired the assets and business of the Puritan
Corporation and the Realty Acceptance Corporation. Ihe Puritan Corporation
has been engaged in underwriting first mortgage real estate bons, iiie Realty
Acceptance Corporation in the financing of second mortgages. These two com¬
panies were taken over through an exchange of stock which resulted in the
Industrial Finance Corporation's acquisition of more than 50 percent of the
common stock of general bond and share. The latter was in turn absorbed in
1930 by Industrial Realty Shares, Lao., a Delaware corporation organized
for this purpose and also controlled by Industrial Finance Corporation.
In 1928 another company, the North America funding corporation, was
organized, this too controlled by the Industrial Finance Corporation, to
extend amortized first mortgage loans on residential property to the
customers of Morris Plan banks and companies. The corporation was to lend
^Ibid., for the year ended December 31, 1939.
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to 75 percent of the value of the property as security for its bonds;
the balance of the mortgage was piurchased as a junior lien by the Realty
Acceptance Corporation.
The operations of the North American Pmding Copporation were
financially successful tintil the collapse of real estate values in 1929-
30, In the following period the corporation gradually liquidated its
holdings at substantial loss, and suspended new financing. By 1933 it was
1
reptirchasing at prices "materially below their par value" the $3,000,000
of bonds issued in connection with its financing. Ihis process was
financed in part by a loan of $525,000 from the Reconstruction Finance
Corporation, which was fully repaid during 1935, and in part through "the
conversion of mortgages into Home Owners Loan Corporation bonds and the
2
subsequent sales of these bonds." The fact that during the year 1937 the
3
North America Financing Corporation wrote off $617,713 in assets provides
some indication of the loss substatined by the ooiq>any as a result of its
venture into real estate financing. By the end of 1938 the ooiT)oration
had reduced its bonds outstanding to $195,900, and its assets amounted to
only about $650,000, of which seme $425,000 was the equity of the Industrial
4
Finance Corporation.
It may be observed ihat the same annual report of the Indxistrial
^Industrial Finance Corporation, Annual Report to Stockholders, for
the year ended Jaxmary 31, 1933, p. 3,
2
Ibid., for the year ended January 31, 1931, p. 3.
g
Ibid., for the year ended January 31, 1938, p. 4,
^Ibid., for the year ended January 31, 1939, p. 4.
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Finance Corporation^ which notes this reduced position of i^e real
estate financing subsidiary, states that the relation of net earnings to
capital, surplus and undivided profits for 86 identical Iforris Plan banks
and companies had increased from 11.6 percent in 1929 to 13.0 percent in
1938. These strikingly di-vergent records, both based on financing
activities in the general field of eonsmer credit, may be reconciled by
the fact that Morris Plan banks and companies participated only slightly
in this program of real estate financing.
The second direction in which the Industrial Financing Corporation
expanded its consumer financing activities was in the discounting of time-
sales contracts. In 1924 the Industrial Acceptance Corporation was formed,
and this company, whi(di was controlled through stockownership by the In¬
dustrial Finance Corporation, took over the sales financing business
formerly handled by the Automobile Division of the parent corporation.
The Automobile Division had conoentreted mainly on financing sales of
Studebaker cars, and for some time this continued to be true of the new
company. Frcm May 21, 1919, to May 1, 1928, the Studebaker Corporation
had formal arrangements, first with the Industrial Finance Coi^wration
and later with its subsidiary. The Industrial Acceptance Corporation,
1
providing for wholesale and retail financing of sales, but in its annual
report for the year ended January 31, 1929, the Industrial Finance Corpo¬
ration stated that its subsidiary had diversified its activities and was
no longer "dependent upon one contract with a single manufacturer.”
Diuring the year 1928 Indtistrial Acceptance Corporation acquired frcm
^Federal Trade Ccmmission, Report on Motor Vehicle Industry (1939)
(76th Congress, let Session, House Document tfo. 468), p. 81^.
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General Electric Ccmpany the capital stock of General Contract Purchase
Corporation and its affiliates. The general program of sales financing
was described as follows in the annual report of Industrial Finance
Corpcration for the year ended January 31, 1930: page 32 "Whenever In¬
dustrial Finance Coirporation owns a controlling interest in a Morris Plan
banks or company, local subsidiaries of these companies carry on the
business of instalment financing, rediscounting their receivables where
necessary with Industrial Acceptance Corporation.... Ehiphasis is being
laid throughoTzfc our whole system on handling the financing for the sale
of General Electric refrigerators and other products under a national
arrangement with the General Electric Company."
During the same period a most unique plan was announced, in Khioh
Industrial Acceptance Corporation was to participate. Ihider this program
Industrial Finance Corporation was to organize "a system of banks covering
all the important cities of Ihis country, to extend to the public every
1
form of industrial banking service." !lhis system of industrial baziking
companies was to operate through 22 regional ocmpcnies; it provided for
the inclusion of companies currently controlled by Industrial Finance Corpo¬
ration and for the organization of many more so-called "member-banks."
The plan was mentioned again in the report for the year ended January 31,
1930, but was never actually put into operation.
Even the relatively modest Industrial Acceptance Corporation failed
to withstand the post-1929 years. In 1931 arrangements were completed
with Commerical Credit Ccanpany Tihereby that corporation was to take over
^Industrial Finance Corporation, Annual Report to Stockholders, for
the year ended Janueury 31, 1929, pp. 4-5.
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the instillment flnanoing business previously transacted by Industrial
Acceptance Corporation in cities irhere no controlled Morris Plan coiq>any
was located. This meant, of coxurse, a very drastic reduction in the
field of operations of the Industrial Acceptance Corporation. At the end
of 1933 the acceptance business was being liquidated end no new business
was being sought. A plan for the Industrial Acceptance Corporation to go
into aaall loan business, presumably on a large chain basis, was annoxmced
in 1935, but no further developments were forthooad.ng and by 1959 the
1
oonqpany was virtually Inactive.
A far more successful venture of the Industrial Finance Corporation
has been its connection with Ihe insxuring of loans extended by Morris
Pleoi indvustrial banking companies. In 1917 Ihis business was developed
Idirou^ formation of the Morris Plan Insurance Society, controlled through
stookownership by the Morris Plan Corporation of America. The purpose of
the society was to offer the grotq) life insurance service commonly
associated with the extension of credit to consumers. Although the real
estate and time-sales financing activities initiated by Industrial Finance
Corporation failed to withstand depression strains, the record shows that
the Morris Plan Insurance Society, deriving its business from the local
industrial banking companies, remained remarkable stable. In fact, despite
its many obstacles since its founding and up to 1940 it enjoyed a con¬
siderable rise in business, and rather steady and substantial earnings.
In the twenty years from 1917 to 1937 its policies mounted in nuaber from
1,432 to 250,765. Furthemore, the Society was licensed to do business in
^Ibid., for the year ending January 31, 1939, p. 5.
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1
28 states} including New Tork.
Other Systems
During the period when ]hd\istrial Finance Corporation was setting
up Morris Plan banks and oon^eoiies} oiiier organizations ^ and also individuals >
were establishing similar systems. Okie of these^ the Wimsett System^ ex>
tended from the east coast to Honolulu; the others were for the most part
regional in their operations. Thus the Hood System companies were confined
to North Carolina) the Morgan Plan companies to Alabama and the other
southern states, the Peoples Finance and !Qirift oon^anies mainly Cali>
fomia, the Communi'^ Savings and Loan companies to Pennsylvania, the
llhrift companies also to Pennsylvania and the Citizens System oampanies
to the mid-western states. None of these systems has suzvived to the
present time, however. Many of the component companies failed, and some
were merged with other companies. Those still in existence, the Peoples
Bank of Atlanta, Georgia, now operate independently of any system but many
of these have retained the name of the system under which they were
originally formed, although there is no formal relationship between units.
The methods by whi<h these oampanies were set tp varied only in de¬
tail. In general, it appears that the orgnnizers were interested mainly
in promotional gains, end withdrew after the companies were established.
They would merely introduce the plan in a chosen city, help raise capital,
train the staff of the new company and supply certain materials fOr the
keeping of operating records. In a few oases the promoters retain stock-
ownership, but generally they were compensated by a flat fee, or a fee
^Louis W. Robinson, op. cit., p. 232.
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related to Hhe Tolume of loans made by -tiie new company in iaie first year
or two of operation. 'Where the promotional group received stock the
local company often reserved the ri^t to buy it beck at a stipulated
price, and where this procedure was followed a commission was received on
the whole stock flotation.
In 1930, two other systems of industrial banking ooi^anles were
organized along somenrtiat different lines. One of these, Southeastern
Industrial Bankers, Inc., operated 14 companies in Maryland, the District
of Columbia, 'Virginia and West Virginia. !lhe parent organization had con¬
trol of these companies throu^ stockownership, and supervised their
1
operation. Capital for the enterprises was raised by Southeastern Invest¬
ment Company. The second of the now systems. Industrial Finance and
Thrift Corporation, was established in Louisiana as "an outgrowth and ex¬
pansion of the business of the D.M. White Company, Inc., of Jackson,
2
Mississippi." In 1940, there were 10 White System companies, located in
Louisiana, Mississippi, and Tennessee. They acted in their own localities
as agents of Industrial Finance and Dirift Corporation, endorsing and
guaranteeing collection on consumer loans extended by ihat organization.
These loeuis were used by tl» latter corporation as security for its
collateral trust notes, which are sold to raise working funds. Both of
those networks are very closeknit, a characteristic that distinguished
them from the earlier systems, many of which were rather loosely organized.




Quantitative Importanoe of Industrial
Banking Company Credit
In view of the difficulties involved in the definition of an in¬
dustrial banking company) the number of such companies which operated in
the United States in 1940 could be only estimated. One way of eurriving
at such an estimate was to divide all the firms which came within the
above-determined definition into two major -types: Morris Plan insti-tutions
and those that were outside the Morris Plan system. There were 94 Morris
Plan banks and companies end 25 branches, excluding intra-city branches.
Massachusetts) with 16 oonpanies (exolusi-ve of branches)) had more than
any other state; it was followed by New York) North Carolina and Ohio;
with 8 each; the remaining 54 companies were sca-ttered through 27 states
1
and the Dis-triot of Columbia.
The companies outside the Morris Plan system) since -they are far
more numerous and less homogeneous) are oonsiderably more difficult to
count. It was estima-bed in 1935 that "approxlma-bely 750 Industrial bank¬
ing insti-tutions) o-ther than oommerioal banks with time-payment depart-
2
mentS) are now operating in this co\mtry." This estimate) however, ap¬
pears -to be too high*
At the end of 1958 the American Indus-trial Bankers Association had
137 members in continental United Sta-teS) and its list of prospective
members -totaled 397. It shoiU-d be remembered, however, that the
^Myron R. Bone, "Current Trends Revealed by Survey,” American In¬
dustrial Baiiker, Vol. 3, No. 4, October 1938, p. 345.
^Myron R. Bone, "Dividends from the A.I.B.A.” American Industrial
Banker, Vol. 1, No. 4 December 1935, p. 16.
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"reputable indtistrial banks and loan companies" which are acceptable for
membership in this orgeinization are defined as any "incorporated company
51 percent or more of lAiose loan business is in the lending of money and
discounting of contracts repayable in weekly, semi-monthly or monthly in-
1
stalments...whereas in the present; study as industrial banking com¬
pany is regarded as an institution which not only lends funds to consumers
for repayment on an instalment basis but also, at least in part, obtains
its working funds from the acceptance of deposits or the sale of certifi¬
cates. As of 1936, among the present aiKl prospectlre members of the
American Industrial Bankers Association there were, according to our
2
estimates, only 317 that confomed with the definition used here. With
only a single exception, this organization did not include members of the
Morris Plan banks and companies, there were 410 institutions which in the
TUiage of the present study, may be regarded as indtistrial banking companies.
An indication of the quantitative importance of industrial baiiking
companies was provided by the estimation that Ihere were 410 in operation
at the close of 1938, extending between $370,000,000 and $425,000,000 in
credit during that year.
^"A.I.B.A. By-Laws Approved as Amended," American Industrial Banker,





When the first industrial banking oosgpeny was organized in Virginia
in 1910) there was no specific law in that state providing for the in¬
corporation of this type of company. Since it failed to fit into any of
the usual categories of corporations, the now fins was granted a general
charter as a Virginia corporation. Although in some states indefinite and
unsatisfactory legal status had continued to the period of this study.
Most states where Industrial banking companies have been established in
any considerable number, as of 1940, had special pirovisions governing
such institutions. There is still, however, no more than a similiarity
among the various state statutes.
It is trtie that some industrial banking companies have been incorpo¬
rated under general banking statutes, thus attaining the status of banks,
but this has not often occurred. 3he main reason why special legislation
was necessary is the fact that in most states liie general banking statutes
were not dr-^ft in s\wh a way as to apply to ■ttie extention of personal
instalment loans, which was the primary activity of industrial banking com-
2
panies. And since the companies, not having bank status, could not raise
loanable funds by accepting deposits, another peoullarii^ not in
^A list of statutes applying to industrial beudclng companies is given
in the Appendix.
John M. Chapman, Ccmmerioal Banks and Consumer Instalment Credit,
National Bweau of Eocnomio Research (1940), pp. 47-62.
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18
oonfonaance with general banking law doTeloped in their operating pro¬
cedure: -the issuanoevof Instalment Investment Certifioates.
Thus the legislation that pertedns specifically to industrial lend¬
ing usually contains prowlsions regarding loan payable in instalments,
the issuance of instalment investment certifioates, and the imposition of
various changes and fines characteristic of the consumer lending pro¬
cedure. While industrial loan laws contain many other provisions, it is
these special features that distinguish them from general bank statutes.
It shoiild not be assumed, however, that such special legislation deals
effectively with all the important problems involved in Industrial banking
activities. Most of these laws make no mention, for exeunple, of time-
sales flnazicing, which was of considerable iiq>ortanee to many izsdustrial
banking companies. A notable exception in this respect is the Indiana
law regulating sales financing which applies as forcefully to industrial
1
banking companies as to any other type of credit agency. At the end of
2
1940, 31 states had some special statutoiry provision for industrial bank¬
ing companies; taithe remaining 17 states no provisions had been made.
The first grovp includes not only those states which had "industrial banks;"
"Industrial Loan Companies," or "Industrial Loan and Investment" acts,
but those in which legal provision for substantially the same type of
operation is made imder the general banking lews, as in Ohio or under
^Consumer Baxdcing Institue, Industrial Banking Legal Digest, 1945,
pp. 131-133.
^Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticixt, Delaware,
Florida, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Bhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, Utah,
Virginia, Washington, West Virginia and Wisconsin. In the District of
Columbia industrial loan companies are subject to a special law passed by
the national legislature, but this act does not apply to industrial banks
in the District that operate of bank charters.
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statutes as in Iowa.
In the 17 states that have no special provisions for industrial bank¬
ing companies these concerns must operate under other laws. In Louisieina,
Mississippi) Oklahoma and Tennessee they are at present chartered under
the general corporation laws. In Georgia one Morris Plan company (Bank of
Georgia) anl several other industrial banking companies operated under an
2
amendment to ihe Building and Loan Association Act. In Illinois, too,
several different types of legislation affect industrial banking companies;
here some institutions operate under state banking charters, oihers under the
Z
State smalli^JriieMdotijand still others under the general corporation law.
The following pages are devoted to a comparative analysis of -ttie
main features of the industrial banking laws in force during the period of
this study. The piurpose of 'the discussion is not 'to present a complete
summary of indus-trial banking law but rather -to show, by reference to the
most significant provisions in a few state laws, how the organiza-tion and
operation of a consumer credit agency of this "type are affected by legal
conditions.
Hegulations Regarding Organization
Most of the state industrial banking laws contain provisions pre¬
scribed in some detail what steps must be taken before an Industrial bank-
4
ing company can be gran'bed a corporate charter. IHie New York law, for





example, provides that five or more persons may form a corporation to
be known as an indiistrial bank by submitting an organisation certificate
to the superintendent of banks and having it approved by that office.
The certificate must state the name of the proposed bank, the place where
its business is to be transacted the amount of capital and the number of
shares to be issued, the address of each incorporator end the number of
shares ho subscribes to, the term of existence (which may be perpetual),
and 'Uie names and addresses of the directors, numbering at least five, who
are to serve the corporation imtil the first meeting of stockholders. An
authorization certificate is issued by the superintendent of banks if he
is satisfied that all the requirements, especially those relating to
capitalization have been met.
This general pattern is characteristic of -the majority of state laws,
althou^ in some, as in that of llfest Virginia, the initial agreement of
incorporation, must be submitted to the secretary of state who, in turn,
1
forwards it to the oomraissioner of banking for approval. In some cases
incorporation fees are charged by the incoiT)orating authority. Most laws
state that authorizing officer must investigate the character and fitness
of the incojrporatori,.
In the procedure governing initial organization a feature with an
important bearing on local oonpetitiTe conditions is that which charges
the charter-granting authority with the duty of considering the application
in the light of the "convenience and advantage of the community." Thus in
the state of Ohio the superintendent of banking is instructed to refuse
^Ibid., pp. 317-S18.
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approval if the establishment of an industrial banking company, called in
Ohio lew a "special plan bank," will not, in his opinion, serve the best
1
interest of the public. In Pennsylvania the Consmer Discount Act,
under which companies engaged in industrial lending may operate, stipulates
that before a license can be issued by the secretary of banking it must be
determined whether such action would pronote the "comrenience and advantage
2
of the oonmi'unity." In the state of Washington a somewhat different
situation prevailed in that the supervisor of banking was required to
decide whether the resources available in the immediate surroundings of
the proposed company were such as to give reasonable promise of adequate
support for its existence.
The intent of such provisions was, of coirse, to limit the number of
companies permitted, eiiher by license or by charter, to do business in a
given c(»nmunity, and the ultimate purpose was to curb ihe development of
severely competitive conditions. There are no data available, however,
on -tiie interesting question of the number of applications rejected on
this ground. In at least one state, Michigan, the law prohibits the in¬
corporation of any new industrial banks. This provision of the Michigan
3
Financial Institutions Act was in effect April 30, 1929.
Minimum Capital Requirements
Another feature commonly found in state laws governing industries





of oompenles seeking organization privileges - is the provision concern¬
ing minimum capital requirements. As in general banking law, the require¬
ments are often stated in relation to the population of the city in which
the principal offices of the business is to be located. Thus in
Massachusetts ihe law stipulated that no company may operate with a
capital less than $50,000; the minlnmm was raised to $100,000 in the
conmunlties with a population of between 100,000 and 300,000, and to
$200,000 in cities with a population of over 300,000. The Massachusetts
law fuidiier stipulated that the minimum capital must be fully paid in be¬
fore business begun. Some state laws permit operations to begin when 50
percent of the capital had been paid in, the remainder to be paid in
1
monthly instalments, each amoxmting to 10 percent of the entire capital.
Other states had much less detailed provisions on this point. In
Indiana, Chapter XXI of the Financial Institutions Acts governing in¬
dustrial banking and investment companies merely stipulated that the
capital stock of any ccmpany operating under its provisions would be no
less than $50,000, the entire sum to be fully paid in before the company
opened for business. Companies incorporated and engaged in business be¬
fore the passage of this law, which went into effect on July 1, 1935, were
2
allowed three years in which to meet the minimum capital requirements.
Provisions with regard to required capital varied in stringency from
one state to another. For a company seeking to operate in a city with a




IToi^h Carolina and Ohio insisted upon a minimum capitalization of $100,000.
On the other hand licenses in Kentucky or Pennsylvania irere permited to
function in a city of this size with as little as $26,000. The minimum
set in other states ranged from $30,000 to $60,000. Then there were some
states, inolxiding Wisconsin, which had no special provision for minimum
capital requirements, and others, Incltiding Missouri, which merely referred
to the general corporation law. Companies operating as state banks or
under small loan laws were, of cotirse, required to meet the special provi¬
sions embodied in these statutes.
Closely related to minimum capital requirements were the regulations,
found in a number of state laws, governing the types of capital stock which
may be issued and the conditions upon which the amount of such stock may
be Increased or decreased. Many states, for instance, sanctioned the issu¬
ance of only one class of stock, lliese provisions need not be elaborated
upon, however, since they have a relatively minor effect upon the business
operation of Industrial banking ccmpanies.
Lending Privileges and Sestriotions
State laws varied considerably in the extent to which they regulated
the lending operations of industrial banking companies, although none of
them failed to exercise some degree of authority on this point. In a few
instances the law conferred a blanket right to lend money. An exanqple of
such legislation was the California Industrial Loan Act, idiioh permited
1
companies to lepd money ”on persozial security or othersise.” A much mere
detailed form of regulation was that embodied in the Indiana Industrial
24
Loan and Inves'tnient Act, which gave oompanies the following lending
privileges; first, to discount, purchase or otherwise acquire notes,
hills and acceptances or other ohoses in action; and second, to lend on
individual credit or the security of comakers, on personal endorsement,
on the mortgage or real or personal property, and on the mortgage or
1
pledge of choses in action.
Several of the states, including Massachusetts, prohibited loans
secured by real estate, and in some, real estate loans were permited but
subject to definite restrictions. Ihus in Indiana a mortgage must be a
first lien, maturing in no more than 5 years, on inq>roved real estate
located within 50 miles of the principal office of the lender. It was
provided also that the loan should not be in excess of 60 percent of the
fair cash value of the property as verified by written endorsement, and
that the total or real estate loans shall not exceed 25 percent of the
total of a company's paid-in and unimpaired capital and outstanding certi¬
ficates of investment of indebtedness. These qualifications did not apply
to mortgages taken as additional security or loans otherwise authorized
2
in the Indiana Act. Two states, Indiana and Maine, explicitly permited
FHA Title I real estate improvement loans. Other lews made no specific
allowance in this respect, but the lending privileges they conferred were
broad enough to permit industrial banking oompanies to take advantage of
the insurance protection supplied by the federal governnent.




industrial banking companies were permited to hold as assets were scarcely
important enough to warrant a detailed x^view, because only a relatively
small portion of indusb trial banking company assets were invested in
seourities. In general, such oon^anies were restricted to investment in
securities eligible for purchase by savings banks within the state.
Almost every law that governed industrial banking contained a
provision concerning the maximum maturity or contract length of cash loans.
The laws of Kentucky, Missouri, Montana, Texas and Utah limited the
maturity of loans to one year; the limitations in Pennsylvania euid West
Virginia was two years. In Virginia, on the other hand, maximum length of
contract was set at ten years. It was possible that despite this extremely
liberal provision in Virginia the supervisoiy authorities would not allow
companies to extend an ordinary industrial loan over such a long period.
Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Indiana, Massachusetts, Ohio, South
Carolina and Wisoonsin set no maximum for maturities; tho ether states
laws were so written as to permit maximum maturities varyixjg according to
the type of loan. Thus in ^ew York, Industrial loans were limited to 15
months except vdien secured by real estate mortgages; for loans so secured
no maximum maturity was fixed. The Rhode Island real estate mortgage loans
extended as long as five years while other loans were limited to one year.
Indiana established a maximum maturity of 24 months on oomcker loans end
five years on loans secured by real estate mortgages. In California loans
restricted to one year, but ooiq>anies were allowed to discount conditional
1
sales contracts for as long as two years. Colorado's law was unique
in that its maturity regulation applied only to loans of less than $500;
^Ibid., p. 21.
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loans of this amount oould not te aztanded beyond one yeeir but there was
1
apparently no limitation of larger loans.
Where industrial banking coiqsnies operated under small loan laws
they were subject to the $300 maximum whicdi applied to nearly all personal
2
finanoe eompanies. In general, hcsrever, special industrial lending
statutes raised this limit to allow the eompanies a far greater freedom
in lending.
As was pointed out at the opening of this chapter, industrial banking
law, almost without exception, imqposed no restrictions upon sales financing
transactions. Thus while the cash loan limit was rather low in a few
jurisdictions, companies were usually free to transact sales flnanee
business in whatever amounts and on whatever terms they desired.
In some states industrial bankiiig oompauiies had grown in sise and
importanee to the point where it had become necessary for the law to stipu¬
late whether or not branch banking was to be permitted. A few of these
states had sanctioned the setting up of branches but had at the same time
imposed certain limitations upon their establishment and operation.
According to the law of Washington, branches were established only
with the approval of the state superintendent of banking. In Michigan the
banking commission had to approve the creation of a branch, and it granted
such permission only ib r branches within the city where the principal office
of business was located. New York allowed branches within the city of the
main office, but only if that city had a population of at least 50,000; it
^Ibid., pp. 23-24.
A
Rolf Nugent, Regulation of the Small Loan Business (New York, 1935),
pp. 149-155.
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stipulated also that for each branch there must be a capital of at least
$100,000. Branches established before Jme 1937 were not, however, affected
by this section of the New York Statute.
Aside from any formal system of branches, there were chains or groi5)s
of con^janies "Hiat had formed through corporate arrangements. About 15
Morris Plan banking companies were controlled through stockownership by
the Morris Plan Corporation of America, and some individual industrial




The majority of the statutes pertaining to industrial banking com¬
panies provided that the state banking department shall exercise super¬
visory authority over such institutions. There were some variations how¬
ever, on this general rule. In California the commissioner of corporations
was the supervisor, in Florida authority was vested in the state comptroller,
and in Arkansas and a few other states the sectirities division regulated the
1
activities of the companies. In those states in which industrial bank¬
ing companies operated under a small loan or a state bank charter, super¬
vision and examination were carried on in the manner prescribed for other
institutions affected by these laws. Some states provided that industrial
banking companies be examined according to the procedure for state banks
or for savings banks.
Examinations varied as to both frequency and thoroxaghness. In general,
state laws required that companies be examined twice a year. In Arkansas
Companies were regulated by the securities division of a state on
the ground that the sales of an instalment certificate constituted a
secxirity sale.
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the securities diTision of the banking department made detailed audits
of the business at any time during the year and as often as it was deemed
necessary. The cost of examination was borne by the banking company, but
its amount could not exceed #10 a day. In Indiana the examiners made
their own analysis of the value of the loans and arrived at their figure
for the net worth of the company. They verified collateral held as
security for loans and noted whether the ledger cards were in baloice.
Also, th^ cbecked to see that proper Refunds were being made on prepaid
loans.
It was a frequent practice to list delinquent loans as "slow," "doubt¬
ful" or "loss," but this classification was probably altered in some states
in accordsuice with the agreement entered into in Jure 1938 by federal bank
supex^isory agencies. This agreement substituted numerical for descriptive
designations, and specified definitions of the various classes. The
adoption of the new classification was recommended to state bank supervisory
authorities by the Executive Committee of the National Assooialnon of
1
Supervisors of State Banks. Examiners also listed loans in the hands of
attorneys, and charge-offs and recoveries. I>etailed questions, sometimes
filling several pages, were asked concerning bookkeeping practices and
office managenent, and the company was required to submit a regular balance
sheet and a list of the directors' borrowings, endorsements and stockowner-
ships.
It should be emphasized, however, that few states provided an exami¬
nation which took account of all the abovementioned aspects of a company's
^Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Annual Report, for the year
ended December 31, 1938, pp. 63-64.
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operations. In some states no examinations was made, with the result
that practices were governed merely by whatever degree of competition
existing in Ihe community and by a sort of self-policing \indertaken by
the firms themselves.
Reports on many company operations were required in most states, al¬
though in this respect too there was no uniformity. Michigan provided
that such reports should be the same as for state banks, and imposed fines
on institutions which failed to file them. Utah required one report annually
and special reports on demand.
In general, the reports called for balance-sheet and income statement
items. Some insisted also upon a detailed account of loans classified by




Industrial banking companies, as has been pointed out, are most ef-
feotiwly differentiated from other oonsumer credit agencies by reference
to the soirees oi‘ their woiklpg funds. As between industrial banking
companies and commerieal banks, however, a distinction must rest rather
upon a comparison of the uses to which these two types of institubions
devoted their assets. A study of the asset end liability structure of
Industrial bankiqg ccmipanies serves to olari^ this aspect of operation,
and also provides the basis for an explanation of the profitability record
of these companies.
Source of Funds
The financial structures of industrial banking companies showed a
marked change as these companies have matured into established Institutions.
At the time of this study, while there was scarcely any real uniformity,
thsire was a considerable degree of similarity, at least within certain
groups of companies. For all companies the chief source of ihnds were
equity account (capital, surplus and undivided profits), deposit and in¬
vestment certificate accounts, and bank borrowing. These varied in rela¬
tive importance, however, from one firm to another.
For a study of the evolution of the financial structures of industrial
banking companies the best available data were those compiled by the Morris
Plan Corporation of America. These data presented in Table 1, covered
the years 1920-37, and although the number of companies represented
31
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changes from year to year^ the coverage of Mcrmls Plan institutions is so
ccmplete that the principal tendencies revealed by these figures may be
considered reliable. One of the more significant of these trends vras the
dwindling relative importance of the equity items. In 1920 and 1921 these
items accounted for somewhat more than two-fifths of total liabilities.
Their relative wei^t dropped sharply between 1921 and 1925, and by 1929
I
they contributed little more than one-fifth. In 1937 equity funds
asujunted to only 17.3 percent of the total assets of the companies covered.
Another trend worth noting is the decline in borrcnving; in the early 1920*s
these represented almost one-fifth of total liabilities, whereas in the
years 1932-36 they aocounted for less than 2 percent, though they rose
slightly in 1937.
While both borrowings and equity funds were declining sharply during
the years 1920-25, there was a noteworthy increase in the relative
importance of time aiad demand deposits and investment certificates, idilch
rose frail 31 to 62 percent in this period. Thereafter the gain was slow
but fairly consistent: in 1937 deposits and certificates amounted to al¬
most three-fourths of the total liabilities of the reporting Morris Plan
institutions.
Data from other sources cover a shorter period of time, but they lend
support to Idle findings presented in Table 1. Thus the decline in the
relative importance of equity funds and borrowings, and the rise in that
of time deposits, are corroborated by figures supplied by the Federal De¬
posit Insurance Corporation, covering all industrial banking companies in¬
sured by that agency in the years 1934-38. These figures, presented in
Table 2, show that the equity funds of this group of companies fell from 17
33
TABLE 1
SODECES OF FUNDS OF REPORTIHG MORRIS PLAN BANKING CO-











1920 87 42.7 31.2 19.9 $31,148
1921 85 40.2 38.4 15.1 34,837
d
• e e e o e • 0 a • • a
1925 98 24.2 62.0 7.7 83,408
d
• • e a • • e • e • a'a
1929 107 20.7 63.9 8.9 138,273
1930 103 21.2 66.4 6.5 143,043
1932 100 23.6 68.4 1.1 109,288
1933 97 23.7 68.0 1.6 99,120
1934 95 23.6 67.8 1.8 106,536
1935 95 21.4 69.5 1.4 122,903
1936 95 21.4 71.3 1.6 143,716
1937 91 17.3 72.4 2.5 157,365
Source: The Morris Plan Corporation of America (Library Bank of
Georgia, Atlanta, Georgia).
^Based on year-end data supplied by the Morris Plan Corporation of
America. The peroeutages do not add to 100; the difference represents
reseirves and miscellaneous liabilities.
^Capital, surplus and undivided profits.
®Im thousands of dollars.
^Data for 1922-24 and 1926-28 are not available.
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percent of total assets in 1934 to 12 percent in 1938. In dollar volume,
however, the equity items rose from 417,517,000 to $20,562,000, an increase
due in part to the fact that in 1938 -there were 71 insured industrial behk-
1
ing oon^anies whereas there were only 60 in 1934. For -this Increasing
number of companies, borrowings, expressed in percent of total assets, de¬
clined in these years from 1.9 to 0.1 percent.
It is to be noted that in the FDIC data time deposits are classified
as either unhypothecated or hypothecated. The former being a clear li-
abili-ty of the company, can properly be considered a source of funds, hypo-
theoa-bed deposits cannot be regarded, howe-ver, since they represent loan
repayments w&tch have not het been directly applied -bo -bhe loans themselves.
In these data there is, of course, no mention of investment cer-bificates,
for all the insured industrial banking companies enjoy the deposit-taking
privilege and therefore do not need to sell certificates. From Table 2, it
appears -that unhypothecated time deposits had been the most important source
of funds for these insured institutions; in relation to total assets they
amounted -bo 56 percent by 1938. Demand deposits, although -they had increased
in relati-ve importanoe, had not been very significant, probably because meny
states had legal prohibitions against industrial banking companies assuming
liabilities of this sort. Supplementary figures on this group of insured
companies indicate that the source of funds were substantially -bhe same,
o-ver the period 1934-38, for the larger as for the smaller companies.
Additional data on 64 Iforris Plan institutions re-vealed a situation
similar to that shown in Table 2. They also serve to supplement the data




SOUBCES OF FUNDS OF INSURED INDUSTRIAL BANKING COMPANIES,
1954-38, IN PERCENT OF TOTAL ASSETS^
Sources of Funds 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938
Equity account^ 17.1 15.1 IS.S 11.6 12.1
Time deposits
Unhypotheoated 56.3 57.7 60.9 60.5 60.0
Hypothecated 18.3 17.6 17.2 18.4 18.2
Demand deposits 1.8 2;2 2.4 3.6 '4.7
Borrowings 1.9
'H.
1.7 1.0 .9 .1
Number of companies 60 62 63 69 71
Total assets 1102,755 #123,342 #146,129 #175,263 #169,492
Sourcet The Morris Plan Corporation of America (Librazy Bank of
Georgia, Atlanta, Georgia.
^ased on year-end data supplies by the Federal Insurance Corporation.
The percentages do not add to 100; the difference represents reserves and
miscellfuieous liabilities.
^Capital, surplus and undivided profits.
°In liiousands of dollars.
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presented in that table, since only 38 of Hie 71 iivlustrial baokiiig com¬
panies admitted to insuranoe by the FDIC by April 1939 were connected with
the Morris Plan. As of December 31, 1938, the equity items of these 64
Morris Plan Banks and oompaiies, though comparatively unimportant, were
nevertheless far more signijQ.cant than the borrowings - 13.2 percent of
total assets as coBipared with 0.2 percent. In the deposit data on this
group of oompsaaies ihere is unfortunately no separation of hypothecated and
unhypothecated deposits, demeuad deposits and investment certificates out¬
standing. The figure for all these items amounted to 71.8 percent of the
total assets - more than five times the figure for equity funds and borrow¬
ings combined.
Some states reports provided information concerning industrial bank¬
ing companies and data from this source are presented in ^able 3, for 1938.
They tell much the same story as the figures already cited. In almost all
the states represented either investment certificates or time and danand
deposits were the most important sources of working funds; borrowings, where
1
reported separately, were relatively slight. Five of these states give
data also for 1930 and 1933, again corroborating, for the period 1930-38,
the finding that deposits and certificates have tended to decline in rela¬
tive significance as a source of funds for industrial banking coiq)mle8.
It will be remembered that there are a good mai^ companies which,
though -they are members of the American Industrial Bcmkers Assocjation, do
not accept deposits or sell invea-tment certificates suad therefore do not
conform with the definition of an industrial banking oompsny, as established
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Connecticut^ 12 56.1 .0 33.8 3.2 15,549
Florida* 6 28.6 65.5 .0 .2 2,543
Indiana^ 8 18.5 .0 69.8 5.1 5,033
Maine 1 33.2 .0 62.3 .0 491
Maryland 1 15.8 74.1 3.5 .0 2,344
Nebraska^ 5 21.2 .0 71.6 1.1 1,343
New Hampshire* 1 5.1 92.0 .0 .0 1,248
New York 15 14.2 78.8 .0 .3 57,726
Michigan 7 11.5 82.0 .0 .0 23,550
North Carolina 33 31.1 .0 60.0 2.4 13,408
Ohio® 8 15.9^ 66.4 .0 .0 20,512
Rhode Islaad 5 27.0 .2 63.3 .1 6,077
Utah* 4 54.4 28.0 .0 lliO 599
Virginia^ 19 49.4 1.8 37.4 6.3 4,682
mest Virginia® 17 53.2 .0 33.2 6.0 5,641
Total 142 $160,748
Sourcei The Morris Plan Corporation of Anierlca (Library Bank of
Georgia, Atlaata, Georgia).
*Ba8ed on reports of state banking departmenbs. Unless otherwise
noted, data are for December 31, 1938. The psroeutages do not add to 100;
the difference represents reser-ves and misoellaneous liabilities.
^’Exclusive of hypothecated deposits.
°In thousands of dollars.
•^As of A»;^iBt 30, 1938.
^As of June 30, 1938.
^As of Deoeid>er 31, 1937.




The trend of the ayerage rate of interest paid by the larger industrial
banking companies on time and savings deposits is roughly indicated in data
provided by the FDIC. On total time and savings deposits the average rate
of payment fell from |1.95 to ^100 in 1935 to ^1.50 in 1938. Total deposits,
however, included some that were hypothecated against borrowers' loans, and
on these the practice of banks in regard to the payment of interest is not
known. If interest rates were computed on total time end savii^s deposits
minus hypothecated accounts, the average rate of payment is found to have
fallen from $2.56 per $100 in 1935 to $1.95 in 1938. Since some of the
reporting banks did pay interest on hypothecated deposit accounts it may be
concluded that in these years the aotued average rate on total deposits was
between the two extremes stated. This downward trend is corroborated by
data on insured commerical banks that were not members of the Federal Re¬
serve System. The average rate of interest paid on time and savings deposits
by this group of banks fell from $2.28 per $100 of total time and savings de-
1
posits in 1935 to $1.82 in 1953.
On time deposits some companies offered an interest schedule graduated
according to the anount held. The Morris Plan Bank of Virginia, for example,
put into effect on December 1, 1939, a plan whereby 2^ percent was paid on
amounts from $10 to $2500, 1^ percent on aooounts from $2501 to $5000, and
1 percent on amounts from $5001 to $7500; no Interest was paid on that amount
of a time deposit that was in excess of $7500, and no interest was paid on
1




deposits of aay bank, firm or corporation operating for profit. The rate
2^ percent had preTiously been paid on amounts between $10 and $5000, and
the bank stated that 94*1 percent of its regular sa-vings customers were not
2
affected by the change. The inference that this statement carries concera-
ing the average size of savings deposits is supported by year-end data, for
3
the period 1934-38, on Industrial banking companies insured by the FDIC.
In these companies savings accounts averaged #189 in 1934, |233 in 1935,
$275 in 1936, $323 in 1937 and $357 in 1938. The average sa-vings account
in the Morris Plan Bank of Virginia amounted to $511 at the end of 1939.
Use of Funds
Industrial banking companies, like personal finance and sales finance
companies, kepp the greatest part of their assets in loans and discounts,
for example, in the outstandiiig consumer receivables whicdi arosed from
their lending operations. For insured industrial banking firms in the
period 1934-38 as can be seen from Table 4, loans and discounts accounted
for roughly two-thirds to three-fourths or more of total assets, regardless
of the oompeny's size. Securities and cash balances account for most of the
remainder, in proportions that vary somewhat, though apparently without con¬
sistency, as between con^anies of different sizes. At the end of 1934 in¬
sured industrial banking companies held, on the average, a relatively high
proportion of their total assets in securities, the average having been
^Morris Plan Bank of Virginia, Annual Report to the Stockholders, for
year ended 1939, p. 6.
^Ibid., pp. 6-7.
g
Both sets of data excluded Christmas savings and other similar
accounts. The number of oonq>anies represented in the FDIC data varied from
60 in 1934 to 71 in 1938.
TABLE 4
PERCENTAGE DISmiBDTION OF TOTAL ASSETS OP INSURED INDUSTRIAL BANKING
















1934 Under llOO 18 70.4 13.9 11.3 4.4 5,490
100 - 200 22 69.1 17.9 9.5 3.5 14,304
200 - 300 8 75.7 7.8 6.0 10.5 6,121
300 - 600 5 81,9 4.9 8.8 4.4 7,497
600 -1000 4 78.7 8.1 9.9 3.4 16,245
1000 and over 3 58.1 30.4 8.0 3.5 53,098
1936 Under #100 18 68.8 11.6 16.3 3.3 6,277
100 - 200 22 71.0 16.4 9.4 3.2 19,265
200 - 300 10 77.3 8.4 7.9 6.4 8,200
300 - 600 6 83.8 3.7 8.4 4.1 8,667
500 -1000 3 85.8 7.2 5.1 1.9 16,473
1000 and over 4 75.7 14.2 7.1 3.0 64,510
1936 Tfcder flOO 17 72.8 8.3 12.7 6.2 5,741
100 - 200 20 73.6 15.0 8.6 2.9 17,783
200 - 300 13 73.6 11.9 10.1 4.4 15,333
300 - 400 6 84.4 2.9 9.3 3.4 9,407
600 -1000 4 82.8 5.8 9.8 1.6 22,831
1000 and over 4 76,6 13.9 6.9 3.6 75,034
1937 Under #100 20 77.4 6.9 11.3 4.4 6,985
100 - 200 20 73.7 11.9 11.9 2.5 19,764
200 - 300 16 73.5 12.1 11.2 3.4 23,383
300 - 500 5 82.3 3.2 11.3 3.2 10,600
600 -1000 3 80.7 8.0 8.3 3.0 14,233
1000 and over 5 76.1 11.4 11.1 2.4 100,298
1938 Under #100 21 74.0 7.7 13.9 4.4 7,685
100 - 200 19 69.4 12.1 16.2 2.5 19,233
200 - 300 17 73.9 6.3 16.8 3.0 25,141
300 - 600 7 66.7 16.0 14.4 2.9 14,197
600 -1000 2 86.8 2.4 7.0 3.8 5,174
1000 and over 5 73.4 11.7 12.7 2.2 98,062
Source: The Morris Plan Corporation of America (Library Bank of
Georgia, Atlanta, Georgia).
®Ba80d on a year-end data supplied by the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporaton.
^As measured by total equity accounts.
^Dollar figures in thousands.
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raised mainly by the large security holdings - over 30 percent of assets -
of the 3 companies in the largest size class. In 1936, however, Ihe pro¬
portion of assets held in seciirities by this group dropped precipitately
for these largest companies, possibly because a fourth compai^ was added to
the gro\;ip, possibly because of the rapid increase in consimer lending in
1
1935, ending the decline that had begun in 1930. The latter possibility
is given weight by the fact that the smaller companies too, thoxigh less
notably, held lower proportions of their assets in securities in 1935. In
the subseq\»nt years security holdings, on the whole, continued to decline
in relative importance and cesh balances tended to increase. Table 5 shows
that the latter represented, for all insured industrial banking companies, a
higher proportion than the former in 1938 - 13.7 as compeired with 10.9 per¬
cent of total assets.
As for Morris Plan companies, it may be estimated that at the end of
1938 loans and discoimts accounted for 78.2 percent of their total assets,
and securities for 8.3 percent. Two years earlier at the end of 1936, the
proportion of total assets outstanding in loans and discounts was somewhat
hi^er - aroimd 90 percent - for companies affiliated with the American
Industrial Bankers Association. These, however, included other types of
companies.
In their characteristic distribution of total assets industrial bank¬
ing companies were notably different from commerical banks. This fact is
of primary importance in e^laining the divergences in the profitability
^Duoan McHoIthausen, et. al.. The Volume of Consumer Instalment Credit,
National B\a*eau of Bconomio Research (1940), pp. 29-32.
^From data in Polk*s Banker's Encyclopedia, pp. 1112
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TABLE 5
PERCENTAGE DISlRIBUnON OP TOTAL ASSETS OF REPORTING
MEMBERS OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL BANKERS ASSOCIATION,





















26 90.2 5.5 1.6 .4 2.3 110,456
Non-Invest¬
ment
21 88.0 3.4 3.6 1.1 3.9 3,708
Source: Morris Plan Corporation of America (Library Bank of Georgia,
Atlanta, Georgia).
^Based on year-end data supplied by the American Industrial Bankers
Association.
^Inrestment ocmpanies are those companies that accept deposits or sell
certificates.
*^Inoludlng bonds of the federal government.
^Other than bank building and furniture
®Dollar figures in thousands
records of these two types of financial institutions. Data is presented
in Table 6 on the assets structure of all industrial banking companies and
oommerical banks whose deposits were insured by the FDIC, the industrial bank¬
ing companies that are represented being the seme as those that were classi¬
fied according to size in Table 4. The data cover about one-half the
estimated total assets of all industrial banking companies, and nearly all
of the assets of oommerical banks.
It is clear that the outstanding asset difference between the two types
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of institutioiJs lies in the relatlre importance of loans and discounts.
Ilhile for insured industrial banking conpanies this item fluctuated, in
the period 1954-38, between two-thirds and three-fourths of total assets,
for ocjnmerieal banks it varied narrowly from more than one-quarter to less
than one-third. The relative importance of securities also differs consider¬
ably as between the two types of agencies. For industrial banking companies
this item amounted to slightly more than one-tenth of total assets for all
years except 1934, when it was over two-tenths, but for coamerical banks it
was practically four-tenths, throughout the period. '
Tfliile both tsrpes of institutions evidenced a tendency to maintain an
increasing part of their assets in cash over this period, the proportion
of industrial banking company assets held in idle cash balances was, in
1937 and 1938, less than one-half the proportion of commerioal bank assets
kept in this form, and in the earlier years it was one-third or less.
CHAPTER 17
CREDIT RISK
In its formation of a credit policy an indiistrial banking company
strives, first to acquire a body of loan sufficiently large to assure
effective utilization of its lending capacity, and, second, to select these
loans so carefully that credit losses may be kept at a minimum. The problem
of attaining these ends is complicated by the fact that loans are relatively
small, so that decisions concerning a large number of borrowers are constant¬
ly to be made, and also by the fact that the decisions must bo reached
speedily. Credits, in such circumstances, mtist be passed within twenty-
four hours; on the other hand, bad-debts losses must be kept domi to some-
1
thing like 1 percent of the volume of all loans made.
Except in regard to a loan seotired by a savings passbook, no company
can tell with ceirbainty whether a borrower will pay his obligation promptly
and in full or will involve the company in collection difficulties.
Potential collection expense is thus expressed in terms of probabilities; '
a credit officer will reject an application of a given type if it appears
to him, on the basis of whatever experience, fact and intuitive perception
he can bring to bear on the situation, that the probable expense to be in¬
curred is greater than the probable gross income to be earned on the loan.
When a borrower is an old customer with a tested credit record the
problem of risk is greatly simplified, but with newcomers, whether customers
or comakers, the credit officer's infomation is likely to be relatively
^John M. Chapman, et.al., Commerioal Banks and Consumer Instalment
Credit, National Bureau of Economic liesearch (1940), p. 113.
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inocmplete and his responsibilities are argvanented accordingly. Like
other consumer credit agencies, the indtistrial banking requires each loan
applicant to fill out a form which provides information about himself, the
loan he desires, end his comaker or whatever other security he offers. Ihe
same type of information, though less exhaustive in detail, is usually re¬
quired of the comaker. Ihis information is sou^t presumably because it
provides either directly or indirectly certain facts concerning the
borrower’s characteristics - moral, personal, vocational and financial -
which enable the credit officer to gauge what the payment record will prob¬
ably be.
Ihe moral characteristic of a borrower, or his willingness to pay, are
indicated principally by his past payment recordj his personal character¬
istics by age, sex, marital statvis, number of dependents and permanence of
residence; his vocational characteristics by the industry in which he is
employed, his position in that indvistry and the permanence of his employment;
and his financial status by his income and by whatever information can be
assembled as to his assets and liabilities. Other factors to be considered
are the relation between the amoxmt of the loan and the applicant’s income,
the use he intends to make of the funds, and the kind and quality of
security he can provide to protect the loan. However, the ability to pay
is not measured by the income alone particularly not by the araoxmt of in¬
come at the time of application for funds. Stability of income and the
1
likelihood of increase rather than decrease are also important. Neverthe¬
less, income is distinctly more important in sales financing than in cash
^David Burand, Risk Elements in Constoner Instalment Financing, National
Bureau of Economic Research (1940), p. 51.
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lending; the evidence, however, is not conclusive, but only suggestive.
All of these factors are necessarily interrelated, and from the credit
officer's point of view they are all to be weighed and considered in com¬
bination.
The present chapter attempts by statistical methods to ascertain the
significance, as indicators of credit risk, of these various kinds of in¬
formation supplied by customers of industrial banking companies.
Procedure in the Analysis of Credit Risk
The data used in the preparation of this study were transcribed from
a sample of 1,S22 applications for loans which were granted by 2 large
2
Uorris Plan bsuoking companies and by 8 ether industrial banking companies.
The contributing institutions were asked to provide random samples of
"good” and "bad” loans. Good loans were defined as those which paid out
without collection difficulty, i.e., loans to borrowers who, on the basis
of their payment record, would readily be granted another loan. Bad loans
were held to be those which culminated in default, or involved legal action
for collection, with the result that the borrower's record clearly would
not warrant the exteas ion of another loan.
The selection of the random samples was subject to only two condi¬
tions: first, that the good and bad loans should have been made within
the seme period of time, and second, that their distributions over that
period should have been neaurly identical. Although there is no certainty
^Ibid., p. 48.
2
The bulk of this information was gathered from Durand's research
sponsored by the National Bureau of Economic Research.
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that the drawing was actually random in the strict sense of the term, the
1
conclusion must necessarily be based on the assumption that it was. The
information transcribed from the loan explication blanks pertained only to
financial, personal and vocational factors affecting credit risk - past
payment record, legal aotioxis in which the applicant had been involved, the
quality of references given, and the like - it has been impossible to
estimate directly the statistical relevance of such infoi*mation. Indications
of moral risk may be inferred from the data only in so far as they are
suggested by such characteristics as permanence of residence and occupation.
The data obtained from loan applications blanks are presented here
in the form of tables giving the distributions of good-loan and bad-loan
samples to the several characteristics of the borrowers. These tabulations
not only indicate the relative significance of these various factors as
indicators of credit risk, but also provide the best available description
of the characteristics of the market for industrial loans. In this latter
connection only the distribution of the good-loan sample are relevant, for
the major!iy of industrial banking company's customers do liquidate their
2
obligations as scheduled.
Two main qualifications should be mentioned in regard to the follow¬
ing analysis. In the first place, the loan samples, both good and bad,
pertain of necessity only to persons whose loan explications have been
approved, and therefore the data cannot be regarded as indicating anything
about the various characteristics of loan applicants as a whole. In the
second place, it cannot be concluded that it is unwise to nake loans to all
iDavid Durand, op. cit., p. 32.
^Ibid., p. 34.
49
persons within any particular class that shows a considerably worse-than-
1
average index of bad loan experience. It is obvious that such a policy
would eliminate some desirable as well as soma undesirable borrowers, for
no class is so bad that it contains only defaulting customers.
Borrowers Characteristics as Facrors
in Credit Risk
The samples of good and bad loans provide data on the following
personal characteristics of borrowers: age, sex and marital status. Per¬
centage distributions of the samples according to these three characteristics,
and indices of bad-loan experience for each factor, are presented in Tables
7 and 6.
Table 7 indicates that a somewhat higher proportion of bad-loan than
of good-loan borrowers from industrial banking companies are wider 40 years
of age, and that a considerably hi^er proportion of good-loan than of bad-
loan borrowers are over 50. The index of bad-loan experience increases
fairly consistently from 0.43 for this latter age group to a high of 1.42
for borrowers between 21 and 26. Thus, tendency is too marked to be at¬
tributed simply to errors in the drawing of the samples; also, it agrees in
general with a tendency observed in regard to oomnerical bank personal loan
2
borrowers.
Table 8 which presents distributions of the loan samples according to
the sex and marital status of borrowers, suggest that well over half of all
^Joseph D. Cappock, Government Agencies of Consumer Instalment Credit,
National Bureau of Economic Research (1940), p. 130.
2
John M. Chapman, et. al., op. cit., p. 120.
TABLE 7
PERCENTAGE DISIEIBIITION OF GOOD-LOAN AND BAD-LOAN SAMPLES


















A Good 5.3 13.6 20.2 16.4 14.0 14.0 417.5 100.0 228 9
Bad 7.1 21.2 21.7 18.6 12.4 7.6 11.6 100.0 226 8
B Good 12.7 16.6 16.1 10.7 10.2 8.8 24.9 100.0 205 36
Bad 15.7 17.4 20.4 14.4 12.9 8.5 10.5 100.0 201 36
C Good 11.7 19.9 12.9 15.2 14.0 7.0 19.3 100.0 171 14
Bad 19.2 23.6 16.5 18.1 11.0 7.7 3.9 100.0 182 6
All Samples
Good 9.6 16.4 16.7 13.7 12.8 10.3 10.5 100.0 604 59
Bad 13.6 20.7 19.7 17.1 12.1 7.9 8.9 100.0 609 SO
Index of bad-loan




Source: BaTid Durand, p. 33
^Based on information contained in 1,322 applications for loems, granted by an industrial banking company
in a Bietropolitan center of the Uiddle Atlantic region (Sample A), an industrial beuoking ooznpaBy in the South
Atlantic region (Sample B), and ei^t con^anies operating in eight different cities and seven states (Sample
C).
^Ratio of bad-loan percentage to good-loan percentage. A ratio of more than 1 indicates worse-than-average
experience, and a ratio of less than 1 indicates better-than-average experience.
^The difference between the bad-loem percentages and the good-loan percentages in the entire grov^ of
classes containing worse-than-average risks. The closer this index stands to 100, the greater is the percentage
of bad-loan, as compared with good loans, that would be eliminated if a worse-than-average class were rejected.
TABLE 8
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF GOOD-LOAN AND BAD-LOAN








A Good 59.5 8.0 12.7 14.3 5.6 100.0 237
Bad 62.4 4.3 23.5 5.1 4.7 100.0 234
B Good 51.1 11.2 9.1 8.7 19.9 100.0 241
Bad 56.1 5.5 9.7 3.0 25.7 100.0 237
C Good 72.4 2.2 10.8 4.9 9.7 100.0 185
Bad 70.2 2.7 16.5 3.7 6.9 100.0 188
All Samples
Good 60.0 7.5 10.9 9.7 11.9 100.0 663
Bad 62.4 4.2 16.5 4.0 12.9 100.0 669
Index of
Bad-Loan




SoTirce: David Durand, p. 36.
®See footnotes to Table 7.
^Includes persons widoised, divorced, separated or not reporting.
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borrowers are married men and that ^out one-tenth are single men, while
the proportion of married men as a group, seem to have an approximately
average record on loan performance, as is indicated by their index of 1.04.
Single men, on the other hand, have an index of 1.51, which is somewhat
worse than average. The indices for women, both married and single, show
that th^ are better-than-average risks. The variations displayed in
Table 8 cannot be considered to reveal a marked difference in -the credit
records of married and single persons, but they are sufficient to indicate
a significant difference in credit experience on loans to men as compared
to women.
Vocational Characteristics
The data on vocation which the semples make available for analysis
pertain to the nature of the borrower’s occupation, the industry in which
he is employed and the permanence of his occupational status. Such factors
are, of course, like personal, moral and financial characteristics of in¬
dustrial banking company borrowers, closely interrelated with other
borrower data.
Certain difficulties are encountered in attempting to classify these
loan samples according to the borrower's occupational and industrial status.
In many instances this information is not reported on the loan application
blank and in other oases the statements are ambiguous. Some of the loans
carrying an ambiguous statement can be assigned to particular classes, but
in general the me ageme ss of information leads to the assignment of a rela¬
tively large proportion of the loans to a miscellaneous category. Moreover,
since the total sample of loans is small it is necessary to classify
borrowers into relatively few, and therefore not very specific, industrial
54
and oocupational groups.
The occupational distribution of the samples, presented in Table 9,
indicates that clerical and wage-earning groups provide the majority of in¬
dustrial banking company borrowers, each of these occupations accounting
for about 30 percent of the total number of borrowers in these samples.
In 1935-36, according to estimates of the National Resource Planning Board,
wage-earners constituted 52.9 percent of the entire non-farm population,
1
and clerical workers 20.3 percent. Thus the industrial banking ooo^anies
covered in these samples appear to have a large proportion of clerical
workers in their group of borrowers, and a considerably lower proportion
of wage-earners, than is characteristic of the total non-farm population.
The indices of bad-loan experience suggest that the professional class,
the clerical class of typist, stenographers, accountants and other office
workers, and the group of miscellaneous occupations are better-than-average
credit risk; wage-earners other then skilled laborers are also worse than
average, though less notably. The other classes - skilled labor, managers
and officials, proprietors and clerical workers as a unit group - appear to
have about an average record of loan performance. Comparable analysis of
2
commerioal baxik personal loan samples confirm these findings, on the whole.
Financial Characteristics
The income-level variation of the index of bad-loan experience is
not statistically significant. This is the seme conclusion as that drawn
^National Resources Planning Board, Consumer Incomes in the United
States (1938), Table lOB, p. 97.
^John H. Chapman, et. al., op. clt., p. 124.
TABLE 9
























A “ 16.0 10.1 5.1 11.4 26.6 19.6 13.9 6.3 8.0 9.7 100.0 237
3|e 10.3 6,0 6.4 16.7 29.1 13.6 16.8 6.0 18.8 6.4 100.0 234
B; 6.6 17.4 2.9
14.1 34.4 6.7 7.1 16.3 13.7 16.2 100.0 241
5.5 13.9 10.6 8.8 33.3 10.2 7.6 14.3 17.7 11.4 100.0 237
4.3 11.4 6.5 10.8 28.7 8.7 6.5 22.7 20.5 8.6 100.0 186
2.7 6.9 12.2 9.6 28.7 13.8 6.4 19.7 24.5 4.2 100.0 188
All Samples
9.3 15.1 4.7 12.2 30.0 11.8 9.3 14.2 13.6 11.8 100.0 663








Source: David Durmond, p. 37.
*See footnotes to Table 7.
^Includes those not reporting occupation.
“Represents Good, *represents Bad.
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1
from an analysis of oommerical bank personal loans, but it is contrary
to the findings arrived at in studies of personal finance company and
2
sales finance company credit experience. An inherent reason for the
smaller significance of borrower's income in analysis of banking credit
experience is the fact that banking institutions in contrast to personal
finance companies, extend the great majority of their personal loans on co¬
makers or single name notes, without collateral security; sales finance
companies, of course, deal almost entirely in retail instalment credit, for
which the cominodi'ty purchased serves as security. Thus -Uie banking institu¬
tions are constrained to give greater emphasis to the e^plicant's financial
position and it msy be assumed that risk selection at the time of application
eliminates the most questionable cases. Factors that indicate the stabi¬
lity of income - such as the nature of a borrower's occupation and -Uie
duration of his employment - are therefore revealed as more signifioant
criteria for an analysis of actual experience than is income itself.
This results accords with that found for oommerical bank personal
3
loans, but it is at variance with the findings in regard to personal
4
finance companies credit risk. In the latter study it was found that credit
experience was best on loans of less than |100 and progressively worse on
loans of larger size, except those of $300.
^Ibid., p. 128.
^Halph A. Young, et. al.. Sales Finance Companies and their Credit
Practices Mational Bureau of Economic Research (1940), pp. 180-83.
3John M. Chapman, et. al., op. cit., p. 133.
^Ralph A. Young, et. al., op. cit., pp. 103-05.
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Loan Characteristios as Factors in Credit Risk
Loan size as a possible risk factor has already been discussed in
connection with the relation of income to credit experience. There are
loan characteristics, howeTer, type of security, length of coxitraot and
less directly, intended use of finds - which are pertinent to an analysis
of risk.
Table 10 shows that in sao^les A and B single-name notes appeared in
the good-loan and bad-loan groups with about equal frequency, end that In
sample C they appeared much more frequently in the good-loan than in the
bad-loan group. This finding is particularly interesting in -view of the
current tendency for industrial banking companies to increase the pro¬
portion of their total loans extended on the sale security of the maker's
1
name. It would appear that then such loans are made sufficient care is
taken in the choice of risk to yield an arerage or even a much better-than-
average, credit experience. IVith regard to comaker notes all that can be
said on the basis of the present samples is that loans secured by one or
two comakers constitute the bulk of the loans in each individual sample,
and that credit experience tends to become worse as the nimiber of comakers
increase. These general fiiklings are confirmed by the study of comnsrical
2
bank personal loans.
It is customary to require a borrower to indicate on his application
the use to which the proceeds of the loan are to be put. It is difficult
lln some oases single-name notes are "husband and wife" notes. The
basic characteristic of the "single-name" loan is that it is secured by
the name of only one incone-earner.
2john M. Chapman, et. al., op. cit., p. 134.
TABUS 10
PERCENTAGE DISIRIBTJTION OF GOOD-LOAN AND BAD-LOAN
















A Good 17.3 11.8 46.8 24.1 e e • 100.0 237
Bad 18.0 9.8 48.3 22.2 1.7 100.0 234
B Good 11.6 37.8 40.2 7.5 2.9 100.0 241
Bad 12.7 30.4 33.3 18.6 5.0 100.0 237
C Good 14.1 12.4 66.8 11.3 5.4 100.0 185
Bad 1.1 17.6 48.9 22.3 10.1 100.0 188
All Samples
Good 14.3 21.4 47.2 14.5 2.6 100.0 663
Bad 11.2 19.4 43.1 21.0 6.3 100.0 659
Index of
bad-loan




Source: David Dumond, p. 67
®See footnotes to Table 7.
^Includes -Hiose not reporting on type of security.
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howe-ver, to make a satisfactory classification of loans according to
this characteristic, because borrower's statements as to the intended use
of the funds may be unreliable and are often ambiguous. Also in many in¬
stances the loan was applied to several different purposes.
CHAPTER V
INCOME, EXPENSE, PROFITS
As vas shown in an earlier chapter, the functions perfbrmed by the in¬
dustrial baolcing companies had a marked effect upon financial structure of
those institutions. In the record of their income, expenses and profit¬
ability, their functional character was reflected e-ven more sharply.
Inc (me
The income of industrial banking companies, like that of other con¬
sumer credit agencies, was derived mainly from interest and discounts on
loans. Other sources of income were interest and dividends on securities,
delinquency charges, insurance commissions, recoveries on loans previously
charged off, profits on sales of securities, and up until 1933 interest on
bank demand deposits, rents and miscellaneous minor items. These sources
varied in importance, of course, with the nature and diversity of operatioxis
of a given company; a firm engaged in what was in effect a general banking
business would draw its income from a wide variety of sources while a com¬
pany which concentrated upon a straight consumer loan business had a
1
oorresondingly less complicated income structure.
The relative significance of the different income sources is evidenced
by several collections of data. Information collected by the Norih CEa*olina
Banking Depsurtment, pertaining to industrial banking companies in that
state, both Morris Plan and others, is presented in Table 11. These data
^Otto L. Lorenze, Instalment Financing and Effective Use of Capital,
Harvard Business Review, Vbl. 18 (1929-30), pp. 234-235.
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TABLE U
PERCENTASE DISTRIBUnON OF TOTAL INCOME OP NORTH CAROLINA INDUSTRIAL












Seouri- Earnings Profits on
ties Assets sold
Total
1928 48 77.8 .2 21.6 .4 100.0^ $1,638
1929 45 85.2 .2 13.5 1.1 100.0 1,619
1930 41 82.7 .3 15.3 1.7 100.0 1,644
1931 40 78.9 .3 19.5 1.3 100.0 1,697
1932 43 66.6 1.0 31.1 1.3 100.0 1,286
1933 33 70.4 2.0 24.8 2.8 100.0 800
1934 30 67.1 2.8 27.2 2.9 100.0 873
1935 29 63.9 3.7 28.1 4.3 100.0 1,000
1936 29 65.8 3.1 24.5 6.6 100.0 1,182
1937 32 67.0 2.8 26.0 4.2 100.0 1,348
1938 33 71.1 2.0 23.1 3.8 100.0 1,461
Source: Raymond J. Sauliner, Industrial Banking Companies , 1940, p. 147.
®Based on Reports of the Condition of the State Banks, State of North
Carolina, Benking Department.
^Includes reductions in valuation allowances.
^Dollar figures in thousands.
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cover a relatively small group of companies but they serve to indicate
that interest and discounts on loans are of predominant importance as a
source of income. Year-to-year changes in the relative vrei^t of this item
during the period 1928-38 show no consistent trend, and it may be that the
changes here revealed are traceable primarily to changes in the composition
of the group of companies for iidiich reports are available.
The significance of interest and discounts as a source of income is
revealed also by Table 12 based on reports made to the Federal Deposit In¬
surance Corporation by insured industrial banking companies. Fiom this
table it appears that ihe size of the oompaxiy, as measured by the total of
capital, surplus and undivided profits, does not stand in any significant
relationship to the percentage of income derived from interest and discounts
on loans.
An important difference between industrial banking companies and oom-
merioal banks is brouglst out by a comparison of the income stzuctures of the
two types of institutions. Data published by the Federal Deposit Insurance
indicate that for insured oommerical banks interest and discounts on loans
varied between 31.0 and 38.1 percent of total income over the period 1934-
1
38. Table 12, however, shows that for insured Industrial banking companies
this proportion was shout twice as high during the same period. This
divergence between the two types of Institutions reflects differences in
both asset structure and Investment policy; as was noted in Chapter III, in¬
dustrial baidclng companies keep a much larger proportion of their total
assets in loans sind discounts than do oommerical banks, because industrial
^Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Annual Report, December 31, 1938,
Table 137, pp. 212-13.
TABLE 12
PBRCENTAGE DISTEIBUnON OF TOTAL INCOME OF INSURED INDUSTRIAL BANKING
COMPANIES, 1934-38, BY SIZE OF COMPANY AND SOURCE OF INCOIE®
Sources of Income
Size Number Interest Interest Commis¬ Other
Recoveriesof of and and Divi¬ sions, Current All >.
Com¬ Com¬ Discounts dends on Fees, Col¬ Operating on Other Total®





panics 60 61.6 7.7 16.7 3.7 6.2 4,1 100.0^ ♦8,788
Under $100 18 64.6- 4.6 21.3 4.8 3.9 -.9 100.0^ 436
100-200 22 66.8 6.2 19.0 3.8 2.5 1.7 100.0 1,214
200-300 8 66.7 1.7 10.2 13.9 5.5 2.0 100.0 598
300-600 5 67.4 2.1 17.5 6.4 3.3 3.3 100.0 783
500-1000 4 68.3 6.7 12.6 1.6 6.4 4.6 100.0 1,693
1000 and over 3 56.1 10.8 18.0 2.5 8.2 5.4 100.0 4,064
1935 All Com-
panics 62 64.1 6.0 17.0 3.3 6.3 3 ..3 100.0 10,233
Under $100 18 64.5 8.3 17.6 3.6 4.0 2.0 loo.o 606
100-200 22 64.9 6.1 19.7 2.2 2.1 6.0 100.0 1,676
200-300 10 65.3 1.9 16.4 8.0 6.8 1.6 100.0 796
300-600 5 72.5 1.4 14.1 6.3 4.0 1.7 100.0 845
500-1000 3 76.3 3.0 8.8 2.4 6.6 3.9 100.0 1,569





panles 63 66.4 4.2 16.2 3.0 7.6 3.7 100.0 12,264
Ihider tlOO 17 70.3 3.2 17.9 1.9 2.2 4.5 100.0 464
100-200 20 66.6 5.6 17.2 .7 4.0 5.9 100.0 1,555
200-300 13 66.6 3.3 18.9 4.8 4.1 2.3 100.0 1,370
300-600 5 72.8 1.1 14.6 4.6 6.5 .4 100.0 786
500-1000 4 76,3 2.0 8.8 3.7 4.1 5.1 100.0 2,324
1000 and over 4 61.2 5.5 16.2 2.7 11.2 3.2 100.0 6,765
All Com-
panles 69 71.1 4.1 13.7 4.3 4.8 2.0 100.0 14,018
Tbider #100 20 70.3 2.6 20.6 2.6 1.3 2.6 100.0 543
100-200 20 70.1 4.4 18.1 1.4 2.8 3.2 100.0 1,645
200-300 16 70.9 3.8 14.9 4.1 4.7 1.6 100.0 1,919
300-600 6 74.4 .8 14.0 5.3 4.5 1.0 100.0 848
500-1000 3 74.5 2.7 15.9 2.2 4.4 .3 100.0 1,466
1000 and over 5 70.3 4.9 11.4 5.5 5.6 2.5 100.0 7,598
All Com-
panles 71 71.8 3.8 16.3 2.2 3.4 3.5 100.0 13,826
Under flOO 21 72.9 3.0 19.0 2.7 1.2 1.2 100.0 669
100-200 19 72.5 3.8 17.6 .9 3.8 1.6 100.0 1,604
200-300 17 71.9 1.6 17.7 2.1 2.6 4.1 100.0 2,069
300-600 7 71.1 3.9 13.0 7.1 2.7 2.2 100.0 1,112
500-1000 2 79.7 .6 15.7 1.0 1.4 1.6 100.0 508
1000 and over 5 71.2 4.6 14.2 1.8 3.9 4.3 100.0 7,963
Source: Rajraiond J. Sauliner, op» pit., pp. 148-194
^Baeed on year-end data supplied by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
^As measiored by total equity account (capital, surplus and tmdivided profits), in thousands of dollars.
Each level is inclusive of the lower figure and exoltisive of the higher.
^Includes reductions in valuation allowances on loans.
*^Inoludes reductions in valuation allowances on assets other than loans, and promts on assets sold or
exchanged.
•Dollar figures in thousands.
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banks having to borrow money that they loan out, therefore, must keep a
larger proportion of their money out on loans in order to have a satisfactory
income.
With regard to income from securities the insured industrial banking
companies stand in significant contrast to the insured comnerlcal banks.
For the latter, according to reports made to the Federal Deposit Insurance
1
Corporation, investment income varied between 26.7 and 30.4 percent of
total income during these same ^ars, and showed no consistent downwEU'd
trend; it was lowest - 26.7 percent - in 1936, and rose considerably in
1937, although it fell again in 1938. For oommerical banks the income
arising from security investments was nearly equal to the inoone from
interest and discounts on loans, but for industrial banking companies this
type of income was scarcely more than an incidental part of the structure.
A group of related items may be considered together as a third source
of income: recoveries on loans or other assets previously charged off;
profits from the sale of exchange of assets; and reductions in valuation
allowances. Table 12 indicates that for insured ind us trial banking com¬
panies this composite source provided, for the group as a whole, about one-
tenth of total income in 1934-36, and about 7 percent in 1937-38. These
items, too, are considerably less important for insured industrial banking
companies than fbr insured oommerical banks. For the latter their signi-
fioenoe in total income varied between 16 suad 27 percent during the years
1934-38, approximately thi*ee-fourths of this non-operating income originat-
2




total inooae arising from reooTeries on loans may indicate changes in
economic conditions, reflected in a nev development in collections ex¬
perience, but also they may merely indicate changes in managerial policy,
reflected in the relative volume of ehargeoffs and subsequent recoveries.
On loans and discounts the ratio of earnings to total loan accounts,
as contrasted to their ratio to total income, had tended to decline in
those years for those indiistrial banking oonpinies whose deposits were in¬
sured by the l^'ederal deposit Insurance Corporation. In 1935, interest
and discounts on loans, plus fees, commissions and charges amounted for
these companies to 1^9.38 per $100 of average loan account, but this figure
1
had fallen to $8.78 by 1938. During this same period oommerical bank in¬
come from loans iremained fairly stable, in relation to average loan account
2
rangii^ from |5.75 per $100 in 1935 to $5.91 in 1938.
Also the average rate of income from security investments had tended
to fall for insured industrial banking companies. Declining from $4.07 per
3
$100 of securities owned 1935 to $3.24 in 1938. This rate had fallen
too for insured oommerical banks - from $3*51 per $100 of securities owned
4
in 1935 to $3.27 in 1938. It is interesting to note the money rate in this
period, as listed below, vhloh played an importanb role in the fluctuating
tendency of average rate of income for insured industrial banks.
^FDIC, Annual Report, December 31, 1935, p. 30.
^FDIC, Annual Report, December 31, 1958, p. 57.
^Ibid., p. 57.
^Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Annual Report, December 31, 1938
p. 57.
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COMMERICAL LOAN RATES AVERAGE RATE CHARGED CUSTOUERS
BY BANKS IN PRINCIPAL CITIES












1935 Aversige 2.93 1.76 3.39 3.76
1936 Average 2.68 1.72 3,04 3.40
1937 Average 2.59 1.73 2.88 3.25
1938 Average 2.53 1.69 2.75 3.26
Source; Federal Reseirve Bulletin (1939), p. 998.
Expenses
The main items of expenses incurred by industrial banking companies
were salaries end wages, interest paid on deposits and outstanding invest¬
ment certificates, interest and discounts on borrowed money, losses result¬
ing from the charging off of defaulted loans and from the sale of assets and
taxes.
Table IS, pertaining to the seune gro\xp of North Carolina industrial
banking companies, shows that salaries, wages end fees constituted (except
in 1932) the greatest single items of expenseduring the ^ars 1928-38,
ranging from one-fifth to two-fifths of total expenses over this period; the
proportion represented by this item decreased in the years 1928-32, and
thereafter rose to a figure considerably beyond its 1928 level. Also for
the group of insured industrial banking companies the proportion of expenses
accounted for by salaries, wages and fees had increased.
TABLE 13
PERCENTAGE DISIRIBUnON OF TOTAL EXPENSES OF NORTH CAROLINA INDUSTRIAL
BANKING COMPANIES, 1928-38, BY TYPE OF EXPENSE^
1929 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1936 1936 1937 1938
Interest on time and
savings deposits 21.3 20.4 23.2 21.9 21.2 18.2 11.7 17.0 18.3 16.9 16.8
Interest and discounts
on borroired money 9.1 9.7 5.6 4.9 4.6 3.0 1.8 1.4 .9 1.9 1.1
Salaries, wages and fees 29.6 29.0 27.8 26.0 19.7 28.1 27.9 31.6 39.5 38.7 39.1
Taxes (other than in-
come) 12.3 12.4 10.6 8.0 9.0 10.2 10.0 13.6 9.5 9.4 9.2
Other current operat-
ing expenses 23.4 23.8 23.9 21.1 26.0 23.2 21.2 26.3 23.5 26.4 23.6
Charge-offs and losses
on assets sold® 4.2 4.7 8.7 18.1 20.6 17.3 27.4 11.2 8.3 6.7 10.2
Total® lOO.C^o 100.0^ 100.09? 100.09? 100.0^ 100. 100.09? 100.09? 100.0^ 100.C9? 100.0^
♦1,092 ♦1,186 ♦l,336 ♦1,689 ♦1,136 ♦763 ♦796 ♦748 ♦744 ♦863 ♦958
Number of companies 48 46 41 40 43 33 30 29 29 32 33
Source: Raymond J. Sauliner, op. olt., p. 166.
^Based on Reports of the Condition of the State Banks, State of North Carolina, Banking Bepartanent.
^Not reported separately.
®I5ollar figures in •thousands.
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The next most important expense item for lnd\utrial banking companies
was the cost of borrowing money from banks or of obtaining funds from
1
depositors or purchases of investment certifioates. Table 13 shoss Ihat
for that North Carolina companies the two items, interest paid on deposits
and interest paid on borrowings, varied widely in relation to total ex¬
penses over the eleven-year period. The former item tended to increase
from 12 to 17 percent in 1935, and thereafter remained fairly constant;
interest on borrowings decreased fairly steadily tiiroughout the period,
from 9 to 1 percent. This item represented a much smaller proportion for
the group of insured companies, but for them too it declined in the period
1934-38 - from 1 to 0.3 percent.
As was pointed out in Chapter III, the acceptance of deposits and the
sale of investment certifioates constituted a major source of working funds
for firms which could be classified as Industrial banking companies under
the definition used in -this study.
Table 13 indicates that for North Carolina firms charge-offs and losses
from the sale of assets amounted, together, to widely varying proportions of
total expenses, ranging from 4 to 27 percent over the period 1928-38; these
conditions can be contributed to the effects of the depression. Neverthe¬
less, these conditions ware relatively most important in the years 1931-34.
Industrial banking firms insured by the FDIC submit reports from which losses
on loans may be computed separately from other losses.
Profits
The profit record of industrial banking companies over a period of
lEmest A. Dauer, Radical Changes in Industrial Banking, Harvard Bus¬
iness Review (1947), pp. 613-614.
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years revealed that despite depression lows these institutions showned a
remarkable earning capacity. Table 14 shows that in the period 1922-38
the net earnings of Morris Plan banking compaides averaged about 10 percent
of total equity aeoount. From an average of nearly 12 percent in the
years 1922-29 they fell to 3 percent in 1933. but thereafter recovered
fairly rapidly, and by 1937 had reached nearly 14 percent, a level ne-eer
1
before attained by Morris Plan Institutions. It is true, however, that
these data pertain to a changing group of companies and weire thus subject
to some critlolsm. Therefore it is worth noting that figures on 86 inden-
tioal Morris Plan companies corroborated the evidence presented here that
net earnings have in recent years represented a higher proportion of
equity fund that they did before depression, for the 86 companies this
2
figure was 13 percent in 1938, as compared with 11.5 percent in 1929.
Table 15, based on reports to the FDIC by insured industrial banking
companies, shoes, for 1934-39, net profits after income taxes and net
profits after the total income taxes, dividends, and interest on capital.
Of the two sets of figures the ibrmer are closer to those in Table 14, but
they are not strictly comparable because they are not exclusive of interest
on capital notes and debentures. It is not likely, however, that these
profits percentages would be much lower if they excluded this item; as was
indicated in Chapter HI, these insured companies obtained but a negligible
proportion of their funds from borrowings - never as much as 2 percent and
^C. N. Schmulz, ’’hhere Is Instalment Selling Headed," Harvard Business
Review, Vol. 17 (1938-1939), pp. 224-226.
^Industrial Finance Corporation, Annual Report to Stockholders, January
31, 1939, p. 5.
TABLE 14
NET PfiOFITS OP REPORTING MORRIS PLAN BANKING COMPANIES, 1922-38,
IN DOLLARS AND IN PERCENT TO TOTAL EQUITY ACCOUNT®
Year Ntmiber of Companies Net Profits^
1922 c $1,506,004 9.0^
1923 c 1,925,192 10.8
1924 100 2,472,154 12.8
1925 106 2,842,317 13.3
1926 106 3,003,419 12.8
1927 106 3,029,129 12.0
1928 108 3,152,490 11.4
1929 108 3,129,773 11.2
1930 108 2,604,511 8.5
1931 106 1,957,525 6.7
1932 102 1,046,049 4.0
1933 92 696,187 3.0
1934 92 1,412,847 6.2
1935 92 2,367,201 9.8
1936 89 2,861,569 11.8
1937 86 3,480,097 13.6
1938 86 3,681,868 13.0
Source; Raymond J. Sauliner, op, cit«, p. 164.
®Based on data from Industrial Finance Corporation annual reports to
stockholders. With the exception of 1938, the data for each year are from
the annual report for the yeeu* ended January 31, 1939.
^Net profits after income taxes and interest paid on capital notes
and debentures. For the percentage figures the base, total equity account,
oanq>rises paid-in capital, surplus and xmdi-wided profits. For 1934-38 'these
data are as of the end of the year; for all other years surplus and undivid¬
ed profits are as of the end of the year and oapi-fcal is an average of figures
for the beginning and for the end of the year.




in 1938 only 1.0 percent of total assets. It is not possible to determine
the extent to which these profit percentages would be reduced if tibiey were
expressed in the same way as tiose in Table 14, but even without such ad¬
justment they reveal that the insured companies, as a group, had a less
favorable earnings record during the years 1934-38 than did the entire
group of reporting Morris Plan companies.
When the insured companies profits are examined with reference to the
size of the institution, it appears that the largest companies, those with
a total equity account of $1,000,000 or over, had the greatest variations
in earnings during 1934-38. In 1934, these companies showed a loss in
their percentage for net profits after taxes, the only loss recovered for
this item by any group of companies during the entire five-year period;
in 1938, however, these companies’ net earnings after taxes amounted to
21 percent of total equity account, the highest proportion found for any
size class. Neither set of net profit percentages revealed any close rela¬
tion between size of company and earning capacity. This lade of correlation
is borne out by earnings data, not presented here, for North Carolina in¬
dustrial banking companies. In 1934-1935 firms in that state were classi¬
fied into three size classes, and In 1934 the largest companies were found
to have the lowest radio of net profit (after taxes and preferred stock
dividend) to equal total equity account, while in 1936 they had the highest.
Industrial banking company assets, as has previously been noted, are
{almost exclusively short-term consumer loans. Commerical bank assets, on
the other hand are about evenly divided among cash, investment securities
(public suid private) and loans and discounts. Moreover, only a relatively
small part of the loans and discounts of commerical banks would carrry rates
iTable 2, p. 41.
7S
of interest as high as those required by industrial bankiz^ companies.
It is because of their relatively high rate of net current operating
earnings that industrial banking companies are able to show higher profit
ratios thm commerioal banks, for the latter spend considerably less per
$100 of total assets than the former on current operating expenses.
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TABLE 19
NET PROFITS OF INSURED INDUSTRIAL BANKING COMPANIES, IN DOLLARS AND IN
PERCENT OF TOTAL EQUITT ACCOUNT, 1934-38, BY SIZE OF C(MPANY®
Year
Nuniber











60 1377 2.4^ 1415 |38 .2^
Uaior IlOO 18 28 2.3 36 8 .7
100-200 22 67 1.8 54 3 .1
200-300 8 98 5.7 52 46 2.7
500-600 6 129 7.0 67 62 3.4
500-1000 4 196 7.1 171 25 .9
1000 and over 3 131 2.6 35 166 3.3
1935 All Companies 62 1,358 7.1 627 731 3.8
Under IlOO 18 104 8.4 64 40 3.2
100-200 22 261 7.7 102 159 4.7
200-300 10 168 6.9 66 102 4.2
300-500 6 160 8.4 83 77 4.0
500-1000 3 221 10.8 93 128 6.2
1000 and over 4 444 5.5 219 225 2.8
1936 All Companies 63 2,180 11.2 811 1,369 7.0
Under IlOO 17 107 9.2 46 62 5.3
100-200 20 363 11.9 116 248 8.2
200-300 13 238 8.0 112 126 4.2
300-600 5 176 9.7 71 104 5.8
600-1000 4 371 13.9 137 234 8.8
1000 and over 4 926 11.9 331 595 7.6
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Table 19 (Continued)
All Companies 69 2,402 11.3 932 1,470 6.9
Under $100 20 121 9.1 51 70 5.2
100-200 20 410 13,5 111 299 9.8
200-SOO 16 374 10.1 147 227 6.1
300-500 5 173 9.1 77 96 5.0
500-1000 3 147 7.1 76 66 3.3
1000 and over 6 1,183 12.8 471 712 9.1
All Con^anles 71 2,638 13.0 1,091 1,547 7.6
Under $100 21 124 8.3 51 73 4.9
100-200 19 209 6.5 140 69 2.2
200-300 17 385 9.6 168 217 5.4
300-500 7 157 6.2 85 72 2.8
500-1000 2 99 7.8 77 22 1.8
1000 and over 5 1,664 21.1 570 1,094 13,9
Source: Raymond J. Sauline, op. cit», p. 165.
^Based on year-end data supplied by the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation.
^As measured by total equity account (capital, surplus and undivided
profits), in thousands of dollars. Each level is inclusive of the lower
figure and exclusive of the higher.
°Net profits after income taxes, in thousands of dollars and in
percent of total equity account at beginning of year.
*^Div'idends paid on preferred and common stock and interest paid on
capital notes and debentures, in thousands of dollars.
®Net profits after income taxes, dividends and interest on capital
notes »nd debentures, in thousands of dollars and in percent of total
equity aocoimt at beginning of year.
CHAPTER VI
COMiETITIVE AND COOPERATIVE RELATIONS
Since industrial banking companies engaged in many forms of lending
which closely approximate and at times oonflisted with tbe activities of
other types of consumer credit agencies, they competed not only with
firms in their o-wn field but also with personal finance companies,
sales finance companies, and personal loan and time-sales departments
of commerical banks. Seeking to clarify their own competitive situation,
and also to resolve a number of other problems peculiar to thsir op¬
erations, most of the industrial banking firms joined together in co¬
operative associations. The present chapter discusses the nature of com¬
petition in industrial lending, and also describes the aims and functions
of the cooperative associations that were formed by organizations operat¬
ing in that fie Id.
Competition Between Industrial Banking
Companies and Other Agencies
The intensity of the competition to which industrial banking companies
were subject is to be attributed to their somewhat anomalous position in
the field of consumer instalment financing. When they extended ceush loans
they competed not only with personal finance or small loan companies but
also with commerical banks. Hfhen they financed instalment purchases they
met competition from sales finance companies and again from commerical
banks. Furthermore, the companies tdiich accounted for the bulk of in¬
dustrial loan credit competed with commerical banks for oommerL cal loans
and for deposits. Some firms, of course, confined their activities to the
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granting of small consumer loans, and their competitive situation was
correspondingly simplified.
In a number of localities industrial banking companies were engaged,
too, in active competition with one another. It was the policy of the
Uorris Plan system to enfranchise only one company in a city, but the
growth of companies not affiliated with this system introduced a new
element of rivalry into the competitive picture.
Competition between industrial banking companies and small loan cosh
panies was significantly influenced by the legal conditions under which
these two types of agencies operated. The loans made by the latter were
limited, in most states, to |300 or less, ^ile fbr the fomer the amount
of credit that was extended was a single transaction which was sonetimes
severely restricted. Sometimes, however, banking companies to operate
under small loan laws, in which case their loans were likewise kept to a
^300 maximum, and in the District of Columbia all companies, except those
operating bn bank charters, were forbidden to extend cash loans in excess
1
of $200.
The intensification of competition between industrial banking and
personal finance companies rose from the fact that the farmer have depart¬
ed from their almost exclusive preoccupation with comaker loans. Thus the
advantage of the personal finance company, which could at one time advertise
the uniquely confidential character of its lending operations, had been
substantially diminished by the increasing tendency of industrial banking
companies to extend loans secured by the maker's name alone, or by the
^See Chapter II, pp. 20-29.
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signatures of husband and wife, or ewen by household chattels. Tbe last
type of loan stood, of course, in direct competition with the primary busi¬
ness of personal finance companies.
From the data at hand it is impossible to measure statistically the
income distribution of borrowers from industrial banking companies. The
scattered e-ridence available does suggest, however, that the larger com¬
panies depended much less heavily than did personal finance companies on
borrowers with annual incomes of $1200 and less, while in general, ths
smaller companies catered to borrowers whose income distribution was
1
similar to that of customers of chain small loan companies. It was prob¬
ably because in most states they were granted greater latitude than small
loan companies in the matter of maximum size of loan, that Industrial bank¬
ing companies tended on the whole to attract borrowers in higher income
groups.
Data on the occupational distribution of customers of chain personal
finance companies shot/ tiiat approximately 50 percent of such borrowers were
drawn from the wage-earning class, about 25 percent from clerical and com-
merical groups, and about 5 percent from the professional class. Although
no comparable data on the occupational distribution of industrial banking
company borrowers could be obtained, it appeared from the limited informa¬
tion available that ihese companies drew a smaller proportion of their
borrowers from wage-earners and large proportions from the clerical and
2
professional classes than did the chain personal finance companies.
As a general rule small loan companies quoted charges as a monthly
iRalph A. Young, et. al., op. oit., pp. 51-54.
^See Table 9, p. 55; also Ralph A. Young, et. al., op. oit., pp. 56-60.
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rate of interest on upaiid principal balance, this rate representing the
1
entire cost of the loan to the borrower. Industrial banking companies,
hcwever, almost always quoted charges on cash loans as a rate of discount,
and in addition levied a fee for credit investigation. Because of this
difference in ms-thods of rate quotation the consumer likely to be coniUsed
as to the relationship between the charges of the two types of agencies,
and their competitive relations were undoubtedly affected by this situation.
The charges of industrial banking companies, when expressed as an
annual effective rate on regularly declining credit balance, amounted roughly
to twice the rate of discount. Ilfhen expressed in this way the combined
maximum discount and credit investigation charge permitted by special
statutes governing industrial banking companies amounted to approximately
2
16 to 20 percent. This was lower than the rates charged by small loan
companies, which ranged ooBunonly from 30 to 42 percent idien expressed as
3
an annual equivalent of the quoted monthly rate of Interest. In many in¬
stances competition had operated to reduce the actual rates charged by
industrial banking companies to levels lower than the legal maxima. This
was most likely to occur where competition with the personal loan depart¬
ments of comnerioal banks were especially strong.
Industrial banking companies, as has already been noted, had branched
out also toward the development of a larger volume of sales finance business.
Through this type of financing iiie industrial banking companies came into
^Rolf Nuget, et. al., op. oit., p. 118.
^See Chapter II, pp. 27-28.
SRalph A. Young, et. al., op. cit., pp. 126-28.
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direct oompetitiTe contact with sales finance companies and with the time>
sales departments of commerical banks. Competition was keenest in the
field of automobile financing, for here looal, regional end national sales
finance coo^anies were actively engaged in serving the same markets as those
sought by some industrial banking companies and commerical banks.
The character of competition in this field was conditiozsed in part by
the fact that in most oases the industrial banking companies conducted
their sales financing as independent units, whereas in 1937 approximately
75 percent of the automobile instalment financing handled by sales finance
1
companies was conducted by three national chains. The independent position
of some Morris Flan banks and con^panies was modified to a limited degree
by the fact that they operated either as wholly owned or as partially owned
subsidiaries of companies controlled by the Industrial Finance Corporation.
These corporate relationships, however, were not such as to affect ihe com¬
petitive position of the individual Morris Plan banks and companies. In a
few cases industrial banking companies, both Morris Plan and others,
operated branches or exercise control over other banking companies through
stookownership. In such oases it was possible to coordinate the activities
of a number of units into a regional system and thus to take advantage of
certain operating effeciencies inherent in that form of organization.
A part of the sales financing activities of sone Morris Plan banks
and companies was carried out through the Industrial Acceptance Corporation.
2
As pointed out above, those companies in which the Industrial Finance
C. Plummer, et. al.. Sales Finance Companies and Their Credit
Polioies. National Bureau of Economic Research (194b), Table 67, p. 264.
^Chapter I, p. 11.
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Corporation had a oontrolling stock interest flnemced tine sales of General
Electric products through local subsidiaries, and rediscounted their re-
ceirables idien necessary with the Industrial Acceptance Corporation. All
other time-sales financing was handled directly by the local Morris Plan
banks and companies.
The Industrial Acceptance Corporation also entered into an agreement
with the Studebaker Corporation whereby it finemced Instalment sales of
the csurs produced by that manufacturer. Subsidies were paid to the In¬
dustrial Acceptance Corporation by the Studebaker Corporation on a plan not
unlike the arrangement formerly in effect between other sales finance com-
1
panies and certain automobile manufacturers. In its automobile financing
the Industrial Acceptance Corporation passed credits and made all
collections on its consumer notes. Local Morris Plan banks and companies
were not oonceroed in this financing arrangement.
In competing for retail finance business industrial banking com¬
panies were confronted by the same problems that beset any consumer credit
agency operating in this field. Where they propose to obtain a substantial
volume through dealer contacts, competition required that they provide the
dealer with a resei^e sufficient to hold his business, if contracts were
purchased on a recourse or repurchase arrangranent, or that they offered some
kind of bonus, if transactions, were effected on a non-recourse basis. In
automobile financing, the financing agency was likely to be cedled upon also
to extend credits to dealers to enable them to carry inventories. Credit
demands of this sort were likely to be large, especially in transactions
67
ISee Chapter I, p. 11; also W. C. Plummer, et. al.,op. cit., pp. 266-
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with dealers who were in a position to oreate a large Tolume of retail
instalment paper, and such demands could not be met easily by the relatlTe
small firms which constituted the majority of industrial banking companies.
Although Industrial banking companies had increased their -volume of
sales financing they still oooupied a relatively insignificant posi-tion in
the field, far behind that of sales finance companies. It was estimated
that a total of #4,279,000,000 of retail Instalment credit was extended in
1
1937, and of this amount Uorris Plan banks and companies, according to
data from the Industrial Finance Corporation and the Morris Plan Corporation
of America, accounted for only about 1 percent, whereas sales finance com-
2
psinies accounted for about 51 percent. On the other hand, only about one-
fifth of the credit extended by Morris Plan companies was for the financing
of retail sales. Data on the sales financing activities of other industrial
banking companies, outside -the Morris Plan system, are not available, but
it is unlikely -that such figures would more than double the es-bimate of
about 1 percent participation.
Evidence is not available -to shew how the price policy of industrial
banking companies compares with that fb 11 owed by the -three largest sales
fineuice companies. Since only a very small share of the sales finance
market is reached by industrial banking companies, it is unlikely that such
firms exert a strong influence on competitive conditions in the country as
a whole, although in particular communities -their operations may attain
considerable importance.
C. Plummer, et. al., op. cit., p. 41.
2lbid., p. 43.
83
Industrial banking companies were in competition witii sales finance
companies also in the cash loan field, although this development was rela¬
tively unimportant. In some instances sales finance companies had licensed
their offices as small loan companies in order that they could make re¬
newals on contracts that originated with the instalment sals of a commodity.
This enabled the sales finance company also to make cash loeois to individuals
not indebted to them on a retail instalment sales contract. One national
sales finance company had qualified most of it s Pennsylvania offices under
the Consumer Discount Act of that state. By this action the company en¬
abled itself to compete directly with industrial banking companies in
making cash loans up to ^5000 in size.
The commerical bank was a more recent rival of the industrial banking
company than either the small loan or ihe sales finance coiiq>any, yet it
was considered by many industrial lenders to be the most impoirbant of all
competitors. A comparison of the small-loan customers served by industrial
banking companies and by commerical banks revealed certain broad similari¬
ties. In a sample of 1,260 personed loans made by commerical banks 12 per¬
cent of the borrowers had incomes of $1200 or less, and in a much smaller
sample of loans made by industrial banking companies 16 percent of the
borrowers were in this inoone group. Thus both samples Indicate a pre¬
dominant reliance on the higher income classes of borrowers, thou^ these
comparisons must be regarded as very rough measure, since the sample of in¬
dustrial bemking company loans is extremely small and therefore subject to
considerable sampling error. A coiiq}arison of these loan samples according
^National Bureau of Economic Research (Financial Research Program),
Commerical Banks and Consumer Instalment Credit by John H. Chc^man, et. al.
(1940), Table 34, p. 128.
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to SkiDOunt of note shows that the two types of agencies made loans of
approximately the same size, each writing about 50 percent of its notes
1
in amounts of less than $200.
Equally fragmentary are the data for comparing the occupational groups
served by industrial banking companies and by commerical banks in their
personal lending. "What evidence can be had suggest that the oommerical
banks drew larger proportions of their borrowers from clerical workers and
smaller proportions from wage-earners than did industrial banking companies.
Both agencies depended to about the same extent on the professional
2
classes.
Thus, with the qualificationsthat the maikets served by individual
institutions may vary widely from the general markets sketched above, it
may be said that, in their personal lending. Industrial banking companies
and commerical banks competed for the patronage of substantially ihe same
group of borrowers, A suggestion of the close identity of their consumer
markets is contained in the fact that in Massachusetts a case was reported
in 1937 and another in 1938 of a commerical bank that had purchased a Morris
Plan company as a preliminary to its establishment of a personal loan de-
3
partment; similar oases, involving con^anies not members of the Morris
Plan system, are known to have occurred in Pennsylvania and West Virginia.
It has also been reported that in other regions commerical banks had
Ijohn M. Chapjan and Associates, op. cit.. Table 37, p. 133.
^See Table 9, p. 55; John M. Chapman and Associates, op. cit.. Table
31, p. 124.
^Massachusetts, Annual Report of the Bureau of Loan Agencies, for the
lioexise year ended September 30, 1957, p. B, and ibid., for the year ended
September 30, 1938, p. 3.
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substantial stookownership in industrial banking comapnies, although there
is no published e-videnoe on -tiiis sort of relationship.
In most states oommerical banks had a competitive advantage over
industrial banking companies in that beside making personal loans they
offered consumers a complete line of banking seirvices. An industrial bank¬
ing ccHupany could offer an equally wide variety of services only if it is
operated on a general bank charter or under liberal industrial loan legis¬
lation. It is important to note that industrial banking companies adiidi did
enjoy the deposit-taking privilege were developing a number of non-lending
features which placed them in virtually the same category as oommerical
banks.
A largo part of the controversy concerning commerioal banks' and in¬
dustrial beinking companies' competition for consumer cash loans and sales
financing services centexed around the question of the cost of making end
collecting loans constituted the main part of the total outstandings of
industrial banking companies and only a relatively small proportion of the
loans and discounts of commerioal banks. As a consequence, when an in¬
dustrial banking company sought to determine the cost in making consumer
loans, it took into consideration all the expenses, overhead and direct,
which were involved in its business, whereas a commerioal bank with unused
lending capacity, ready personnel and available office space undertake to
make personal loans without allocating any overhead costs to this branch of
its activities* Whether the oommerical bank choose to follow this procedure,
or prorate what it considered a full share of overhead expenses to its
personal loan department, was an aspect of managerial policy.
It is clear, however, that an industrial banking company was placed
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at a disadvantage when its oommerioal bank competitors calculated consumer
loan costs without taking account of general bank overhead, and determine
their customer charges in the light of this cost computation.
Finally, it should be noted that some industrial banking company
officials held the opinion that tiie participation of commerical banks in
the consumer lending field improved the position of the industrial banking
company. This opinion was based on the belief that commerical banks
brought to consumer instalment financing a certain prestige that reflected
adventeigeously on the activities of competitors.
Cooperative Relations Among Industrial Banking Companies
There were two national trade associations of industrial banking com¬
panies - the Morris Plan Bankers Association and the American Industrial
Bankers Association. The later organization had one Morris Plan system
belonging to the Morris Plan Bankers Association.
The older of these two organizations, the Morris Plem. Bankers Associ¬
ation, was formed in 1919 and had its headquarters in Washington, D.C.
1
On October 1, 1939, it had 80 iregular and 2 associate members. Its functions
appear to consist mainly of gathering amd disseminating statistical infoma-
tion, conducting management surveys, representing the legislative and other
Interest of members and arranging annual meetings at which members convene
to discuss their mutual problems. Morris Plan bankiijg companies were
organized also in sectional associations, and these had functions similair
to those of the national association.
Published information conoeniing the activities of the Morris Plan
^United States Investor, October 21, 1939, p. 1740 (58).
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Bankers Association is available only in incomplete reports of conventions,
published in the United States Investor. The two publications of the
association - the Morris Plan Banker and -the President's News Letter - were
usually available to its maabers. In an address to the 1936 convention
President Ralph W. Pilanan outlined a course of action for the association
which threw some light on its activities. He urged the fostering of
national advertising, assistance in the development of more Morris Plan
1
banking companies and the encouragement of desired legislation. At its
convention it was reported to the membership that legislative activities
were being continued and that management surveysihad been conducted in 22
2
companies.
In the early 1930*s the Morris Plan Bankers Association was active
in arranging an emergency loan plan with the volimtary cooperation of member
companies. Each subscriber to the arrangement was to be prepared to advance
an allotted quota of fxmds, not exceeding a total of 2 percent of its
capital, stirplus pnd undivided profits, to a common pool which was to provide
emergency loans to members. If a Morris Plan banking company were to
suffer an unusually large wiijidrawal, it might inform national headquarters
of its need. An official would be sent to make an examination, and his re¬
commendations to headquarters would be commvaiicated to all members of the
pool. Each member would then be directed to send its quota to trustees
appointed for the occasion. The advance of funds would involve little risk
to the members, since the borrcwing company was to pledge notes of its
own customers as security and the payments of these notes would soon cancel
^Ibid., October 3, 1936, p. 1435 (3).
^Ibid., October 21, 1939, p. 1740 (58).
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the loan. This sort of assistance was not often invoked, but many com¬
panies regarded its availability as a great advantage.
The American Industrial Bankers Association was formed in 1934. Its
members numbered approximately 150, membership being open to companies which
had been approved by the Membership Committee. Ihe by-laws, as was amended,
contained the following definition of eligibility: "An industrial bank
(except those so chartered by law) shall be defined as en. incoirporated com¬
pany 51 percent or more of irtiose loan business is the lending of money and
discounting of contracts repayable in weekly, semi-monthly or monthly in¬
stalments} and which may or may not issue to the borrower simultaneously
with the loan transaction its own written evidence of debt, and whose
average total charge on personal loans.. ..shall not exceed "the maxinnmi amovint
prescribed for each state by resolution adopted by the Board of Directors of
12
Uiis Association."
The requirements for membership differed from those originally pre¬
scribed. In the beginning the by-laws stated merely that membership was to
3
be limited to "reputable industrial banks." This original position was
subsequently modified to require that members should have 90 percent of their
loan business in instalment cash loans, and that the average total charge on
such loans might not exceed 12 percent per year discounted in advance of 2
4
percent per month calculated on the vaapaid monthly balance. In Hbvember,
^Ibid.. March 26, 1932, pp. 406 (6) - 407 (7).
^"A.I.B.A, By-Laws Approved as Amended" in American Industrial Banker,
Vol. 2, No. 4 (Deommber 1936), p. 13.
17
^"By-Laws,American Industrial Bankers Association" in ibid., Vol. 1,
No. 1 (November 1934), p. 11.
^"Industrial Bank Defined at Institute" in ibid., Vol. 2, No. 2 (June
1936), p • 6.
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1936, iiie 1940 "51 percent” requirement was adopted. Since consumer credit
agencies ■which did not tedce deposits or issue instalment investment certi¬
ficates -were regarded as eligible for membership, the association had some
members ■which caimot be classified as indtistrial banking companies under
the definition adopted in this s'tudy.
The association's acti^vities had broadened rapidly in scope as of 1940.
An important legislative activity had been the formulation of a proposed
1
uniformed industrial banking law, and the association also maintained a
legislative committee which kept members informed of current developments.
Each year a fairly detailed questionnaire concerning operating methods and
credit experience was sent to -aie membership of the association. 3he re¬
sults were tabulated and -the data were published in the proceedings of the
annual convention.
The association published the "American Industrial Banker," a bimonthly
magazine containing articles by persons prominent in industrial lending and
allied fields. It also sponsored the organization of several state and
regional associations of industrial banking companies.
^See Chapter II, pp. 29-30.
CHAPTER VII
SHMMARY
The indiistrial banking oompary, -which in many respects resembled other
ins-titutions engaged in financing consimiersy was most readily identified by
its THiique combination of loan and savings functions. Ihis characteristic
was adopted as the basis for the definition of such companies -that was used
in this study: Ihey were regarded as all institutions which extended consumer
loans, repayable on an instalment basis, and -vdiich obtained at least part of
their working funds from the acceptance of deposits or the sale of investment
certificates. It is not feasible to tase legal status as the basis for de¬
finition, because the laws governing industrial banking companies were often
indefinite, sometimes conflicting. Nor were corporate titles a sufficient
basis for identifications many companies used the words "Morris Plan" in
their titles, but an increasing number were not affiliated with the Morris
Plan system.
Industrial lending began in the TJhited States in 1910 with the formation
of the Fidelity Savings and Trust Company at Norfolk, Virginia. Established
by Arthur J. Morris, it marked the beginning of a Morris Plan system which at
the end of 1937 comprised 94 banks and companies operating in 119 cities.
An indication of -the quantitative importance of industrial banking com¬
panies was provided by the estimation that there were 410 in operation at the
close of 1938, extending between $370,000,000 and $425,000,000 in credit
dialing that year. The scope of industrial lending is further indicated by
the estimate that services of these companies were used by approximately
1,500,000 persons during 1938.
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Since it did not fit into any of the usual categories of corporations,
the first industrial banking company was granted a general charter as a
Virginia corporation. To some extent this uncertain status exists even
now, but in 31 states special statutory provisions have been made for this
type of agency. In a few states, even those that have made special provisions
for industrial banking companies, these institutions operate xuider regular
charters; in other states they conduct their business luader special sections
of the small loan law.
Almost all state laws gave industrial banking companies extensive lend¬
ing privileges. Regulations as to the maximum size of note, rarely set at
less than $1000, were generally much more liberal than small loan law limi¬
tations. Restrictions, when they existed, were usually limitations on, or
outright denials of, the right to make real estate loans; there were also
maturity regulations, and restrictions on the tjrpe of investment securities
that could be held as assets.
In having the greatest proportion of their assets in consumer loans and
discounts industrial banking companies were notably different from oommerical
banks; but their major reliance on deposits and investment certificates as a
source of funds distinguished them from other agencies of consimier instalment
credit. Savings deposits in institutions with deposits insured by the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation showed a tendency to increase in average
size rising from $189 in 1934 to $367 in 1938.
For their relatively insignificant proportion of funds obtained through
bank loans, industrial banking companies’ rates varied from to 6 per cent;
the rate paid for funds raised through deposits and the sale of investment
certificates rsuiged mainly from 2 to 4 percent, though as a rule, funds ob-
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tained through the sales of certificates proved more costly than funds ob¬
tained through savings deposits. Data on insured industrial banking com¬
panies indicated that the average interest paid on deposits tended to decline
somewhat from 1935 to 1940.
An Important consideration in consumer instalment lending was the rela¬
tive degree of risk involved in various types of loans and various classes
of customers. Conclusions expressed here were derived from a st\*iy of risk
factors based on a sample of 1,322 accepted loan applications, sutmitted by
2 large Morris Plan and 8 other industrial banking companies. The cooperat¬
ing institutions were asked to provide random samples of about the same number
of "good" and "bad" loans over approximately the same period - the former de¬
fined as loans that paid out without collection difficulty, the latter as
loans that ended in chargeoff or legal action for recoveiry. Since the oases
studied referred to credits actually extended, and experiences thereon, the
findings were relevant only to actual borrowers and not to the much larger
group of potential customers.
Analysis of these samples revealed that certain personal characteristics
of borrowers were significantly related to collection experience. Thus
credit experiences were better on loans made to older borrowers; women
borrowers were revealed as better credit risks ihan men; borrowers who had
resided in the same city for a considerable period of time had better records
than those with shorter durations of residence. Marital status and numbers
of dependents, on the oliier hand, did not appear to bo significantly related
to credit experience. It should be noted ^ain, however, that these findings
refer to successful loan applicants and that the results were more reflective
of the care with which certain borrower charactoristios were taken into
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accoxmt by loan officers than of the risk inherent in a particular class of
potential borrowers.
About three-quarters of the income of industrial banking companies oame
from interest and discounts of loans; fees^ charges and ccnmissions amounted
to from 10 to 15 percent of gi*os3 income. Siterest and dividends on securi¬
ties seldom amounted to more than 5 percent of gross inccme. Data on in¬
sured industrial banking compsinies revealed that income from interest and
discoxmts on loans, plus fees and other charges declined frcm $9.38 per $100
of average loan account in 1936 to $8.73 in 1938.
An indication of the profitability of industrial banking companies was
provided by a ratio of profits to total equity account. For Morris Plan com¬
panies -ttiis figtire averaged about 10 percent during the years 1922-38. In¬
sured industrial banking ccmpanies showed a consistently better earnings
record than insured commerical banks, despite the fact that existing operat¬
ing expense of the former, when expressed per $100 of total assets, were well
over twice as high as those of the commerical banks.
The conq)etitive situation of industrial banking companies were unique in
that the diversification of their activities brou^t them into direct contact
vrith all types of consumer credit agencies. In making cash loans they competed
with small loan companies, credit imions and personal loan departments of
commerical banks, and in financing retail instalm^t sales they competed with
commerical batiks and sales finance companies. Morris Plan companies were so
located as not to compete wiih one another, but there was a substantial de¬
gree of competition between Morris Plan and other industrial banking companies.
The tendency of sales finance ccmpanies to enter the cash loan field brou^t
a new element of competition into the market. Sales finance companies
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effected this diversifioetion of their activities by taking out licenses
under small loan statutes or by incorporating or qualifying offices as in¬
dustrial bazdcing companies.
Another development in the ocmpetitive situation was an extension of
oommerioal loans by industrial banking companies, espeoially the larger ones,
an activity which, like the acceptance of deposits, brought them again into
competition with ccmmerical banks. At the end of 1938 nearly 12 percent of
the total loans and discounts of insured industrial banking companies were
classified as commerical loans.
Measures of the extent to which there was overlapping of the markets
served by these various agencies are difficult to make, but it appears that
in regard to cash loans the industrial banking company market was much
closer in character to that of the ccmmerical bank personal loan department
than it was to the market served by the personal finance company. The rela¬
tive closeness of competition between industrial banking companies and com¬
merical banks was indicated also by the fact that iheir loan charges were
very nearly the same, while in many cases the charges of industrial banking
companies were substantially lowOr than small loan company rates. Competi¬
tion with sales fimnce companies was largely in the automobile field, which
accounted for about 75 percent of the retail instalment paper pttrchased by
industrial banking companies. This competition was not very significant,
however, for the volume of retail sales financing conducted by industrial
banking companies represented less than 5 percent of the total volimie of
this type of paper handled by all agencies combined.
Cooperative relations amoaag indvistrial banking companies are effected
through two associations - the American Industrial Bankers Association and
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the Morris Plan Bankers Association - both of which perform the usual trade
association fiaiction.
In conclusion, the indvistrial banks played an immensurable role in giving
an "up-lift" to the stability of the Anerican economy in periods of recession
and depressions. It showed its influence during the early thirties,
especially, in spite of the impact of the economic conditions of this period.
During a revival period, it goes without saying that, a contraction of
this form of credit would have been a depressing factor. If, for example,
the industrial banking system had been abolished, the effect would have been
deflationary. As long as indvistrial banks were functioning, expenditures on
constanption good indiistries were experiencing a rise in sales.
Furthermore, partly because of the unique and different type of credit
that industrial banking introduced and fosteres, i.e., granting credit to
salaried persons and wage earners, the economy realized a growth in the con-
svaner markets never before realized. This growth was especially noted in
the durable goods industry. Hence, it appears that the long-run growth in
industrial banking was closely related to this growth in the consxmier goods
market.
The two primary factors, the growth in durable consumer goods and the
sound lending policies and practices of industrial banking, gained it the
respect of the consuming public as well as bankers and legislators. 'When
commerical banking authorities saw the advantages that this lending insti¬
tution was fostering} "they immediately began to establish consxaner loan de-
paidanents in all of their banks. Ihey had once considered the "average" con-
simer a poor credit risk, but as pointed out in Chapter IV of this study
the credit risk which are inherent can be controlled throiogh techniques
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developed largely by the industrial banking industry.
Therefore, in conclusion, we believe that the information that is con¬
tained in this study conclusively proves that the effective role that in¬
dustrial banks in financing consumer credit held on aggregate expenditures
was one of the most important influences on economic activity and stability
of the American economy d\iring the period studied.
APPENDIX
LIST OF INDUSTRIAL LOAN LATIR^
Ilie following is a list of the state statutes under which the industrial
banking companies operate. States for which no references are given make no
special legal provisions for industrial banking operations.
Arizona. Revised Code (Struokmeyer) 1928, Ch. 46, Sec. 2006. Morids Plan
Companies Plan. And the Industrial Bank Act, 1937 (Chap. 51, Article
10, Arizona Code, Annotated, 1939), pp. 5-8.
Arkansas. Ihe Industrial Loan Institution Act, Chapter III, Laws of 1941,
pp. 9-17.
California. Industrial Loan Act, Chapter 1187, Statutes 1941, approved
July 15, 1941, in effect September 13, 1941; Chapter 298, Statutes
1943, approved May 2, 1943, in effect Augrost 4, 1943, pp. 19-52.
Colorado. Industrial Bank Act. Session Laws 1941, Chapter 85. As Amended
by B:. B. 321, Approved March 26, 1941, pp. 63-70.
Connecticut. Industrial Bank Act, amended (Ch. 211) 1937, pp. 71-81.
Delaware. The General Corporation Law of Delaware. (Ch. 65, Rev. Code
Del. 1915); Revised Code Delaware 1935, pp. 82-95.
District of Columbia. Manufacturing, Agricultural, Mining, Mechanical
Inswanoe, Mercantile, llransportation. Market and Savings Bank Cor¬
porations Act. Code of District of Colmbla 1929, Title 5, Ch. 9,
Secs. 261-262, pp. 96-110.
Florida. Morris Plan Bank Act; as amended by Ch. 18025, Laws of 1937,
pp. 99-110.
Georgia. Building and Loan Associations and Their Regiilation, (Jeorgia
Code 1933, Chapter 16, 101-105, pp. 111-116.
Illinois. The Personal Loan and Savings Bank of Chicago, Illinois; Illinois
Revised Statutes, 1941, Ch. 74, Secs. 1-10, p. 118.
Indiema. The Indiana Industrial Loan and Investment Act; March 1, 1935,
Amended 1937, pp. 119-133.




Iowa. Loan Corporation Act; Code of Iowa 1939, Ch. 332, pp. 135-136.
Kansas. The General Corporation Laws, General Statutes, 1935, Ch. 17,
Item 53 of Article 2, Sec. 17-202, pp. 137-138.
Kentucky. Ihe Loan and Investment Act; Kentucky Statutes, Section 2223b-
1-8, 1930, pp. 139-143.
Maine. Industrial or Morris Plan Banks, Maine Revised Statutes, 1930, Ch.
57, Secs. 133-141, L. 1935, Ch. 106, P. 242, pp. 145-149.
Maryland, The Annotated Code of the Public General Laws of Maryland (1959
Supplement), Art. 58A, Sect. 19, pp. 150-161.
Massachiisetts. Annotated Laws of Massachusetts (Culmulatlve Supplement,
1938), Vol. V, Ch. 172A, Sects, 1-14, pp. 152-163.
Michigan. Financial Institution Act of Michigan, Section 187, 1939, p.
164.
Minnesota. The Industrial Loan and Thrift Compeuoy Law, Sections 7774-25,
1939; Amended by law 1943, o. 67, s. 1, pp. 165-172.
Missouri. Loan and Inveshnent Company Act, Chapter 33, Article 8, R.S. of
Missouri 1939; amended by law 1943, pp. 177-182.
Montana. Morris Plan Companies Act (R.C. 1935, Anno., Secs. 6109.1-6109.
11; L. 1925, Ch. 119), pp. 183-187.
Nebraska, Industried Loan and Investment Company Act, Session Laws 1943
Chapter 12, pp. 188-197.
Now Hampshire. Manchester Morris Plan Bank, Laws 1921, Ch. 274, p. 199.
New York. Banking Law of New York, Article 7; Industrial Banks 1934, pp.
204-234.
North Carolina. Industrial Bank Act, Code of 1959, Chapter 6, pp. 235-244.
Ohio. Throckmorton’s Annotated Code 1936, 1937 Supplement, Section 710-
41, pp. 246-249.
Oregon. Oregon Code 1930, Vol. II, Title XXXII, Ch. 24, Sect. 22, p. 251.
Pennsylvania. The Consmer Disooimt Act, Laws of 1937, P.L. 262, pp. 264-
272.
Rhode Island. Loan and Investment Companies, General Law 1938, Ch. 145,
pp. 273-278.
South Carolina. The Homestead Bank Act, Law of 1932; Amended by Laws 1934
and 1940, pp. 279-281.
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Texas. The Texas Banks and Banking Act, Code of 1925, Revised 1943, pp.
289-305.
Utah. Industrial Loan Companies, Revised Statutes, 1933, Title 7, Chapter
6, pp. 306—310.
Virginia. The Morris Plan Bank of Virginia, Law of 1934, pp. 312-314.
Washington. Industrial Loan Con^jany Act, Law of 1939, pp. 315-316.
West Virginia. Industrial Loan Companies, Miohie's Code, 1943, Chapter 31,
Article 7, pp. 317-325.
Wisocnsin. Loan Associations, Wisconsin Statutes, 1941, Title XIV, Chapter
115, pp. 327—330.
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